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WE THE PEOPLE[S], ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
Henry Paul Monaghan*
[The Constitution is] neither wholly national nor whollyfederal.'
I. INTRODUCrION
Recent legal and political activity and renewed academic discussion
have focused considerable attention on the nature of the federal system
that the founders created some two hundred years ago. In two important
decisions in the 1994 Term, the Supreme Court addressed this issue. No
fewer than fifteen states have recently passed resolutions reasserting the
importance of the Tenth Amendment-the constitutional affirmation of
the limits on national authority. Additionally, legal academics have ad-
vanced arguments intended to alter settled understandings about the
constitutional framework established in 1789. This widespread reexami-
nation of the nature and limitations of our federal system has the poten-
tial to play a significant role in the current political transformation of our
country, and the results of this debate could affect the lives of all
Americans.
In this Article, I examine the tensions inherent in the "neither
wholly national nor wholly federal" constitutional order created in 1789.
I also seek to dispel the notion that historical revisionism can erase the
many democracy-restraining features of the Constitution. In doing so, I
focus primarily on Article V-the amending provision-which illumi-
nates the state-oriented compromises and democracy-restraining features
that were built into the Constitution. I respond directly to Professor
Akhil Amar, who has advanced an appealing, but historically groundless,
claim that despite Article V, the Framers intended that a simple majority
of a national "We the People" could amend the Constitution. 2 Professor
Amar's claim suffers from two deep flaws: It ignores the crucial role re-
served for the states in the newly established constitutional order, and it
also ignores the fact that the Constitution nowhere contemplates any
* Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia University. This
Article is dedicated to the memory of Paul Wallace, gone but by his family and his friends
never forgotten. I am grateful to the many Columbia Law School students who
contributed to this Article. My thanks to members of my seminar on Article V, to my
research assistants Ezra Field and Nestor Davidson, and particularly to Elaine Colin for her
insightful editing.
1. The Federalist No. 39, at 246 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2. See Akhil R. Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Consent of the
Governed]; Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside
Article V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043 (1988) [hereinafter Amar, Philadelphia Revisited].
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form of direct, unmediated lawmaking or constitution-making by "the
People."
A. Current Events
Two important Supreme Court decisions in the 1994 Term struggled
with the implications of a constitutional system that is "neither wholly
national nor wholly federal"3 In United States v. Lopez,4 an opinion laden
with citations to The Federalist that emphasized the limited nature of na-
tional power under the Constitution, a 5-4 majority concluded (to the
surprise of most lawyers and judges, but to the absolute delight of many
constitutional law teachers) that an act of Congress regulating private
conduct exceeded "the authority of Congress '[tlo regulate Commerce
• .. among the several States.' "-5 Even the dissenting justices acknowl-
edged some (albeit unspecified) limits on congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause.6 Lopez underscored the "federal" side of the 1789
constitutional understanding.
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,7 by contrast, underscored the "na-
tional" side of that understanding. There, in the context of a 5-4 holding
that the states could not add qualifications for membership in the Senate
or House of Representatives to those established by Article 1,8 the Court
focused on even more fundamental questions about the relationship be-
tween the federal government and the states. Markedly different views on
the nature of the founding were expressed in the concurring and dissent-
ing opinions. For example, in his concurrence, Justice Kennedy said: "In
my view ... it is well settled that the whole people of the United States
asserted their political identity and unity of purpose when they created
the federal system." 9 Justice Kennedy went on, however, to acknowledge
that the Constitution did not abrogate the separate identities of the
3. The Federalist No. 39, at 246 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
4. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
5. Id. at 1626.
6. See, e.g., id. at 1661 (BreyerJ., dissenting) ("To hold this statute constitutional is
not to 'obliterate' the 'distinction of what is national and what is local.' ").
7. 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
8. See id. at 1845 (discussing U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (qualifications for
membership in House of Representatives) and U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (qualifications
for membership in Senate)).
9. Id. at 1872 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy added, "A distinctive
character of the National Government, the mark of its legitimacy, is that it owes its
existence to the act of the whole people who created it. It must be remembered that the
National Government too is republican in essence and in theory." Id. (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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peoples of the several states;10 rather, he said, the Constitution embodied
"the dual character of the Federal Government."
11
Writing in dissent for four justices, Justice Thomas articulated a far
more state-centered approach: "The ultimate source of the
Constitution's authority is the consent of the people of each individual
State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a
whole."' 2 Justice Thomas insisted that the "Constitution simply does not
recognize any mechanism for action by the undifferentiated people of
the Nation."
1 3
In a paragraph important for this Article, Justice Thomas added:
In short, the notion of popular sovereignty that undergirds the
Constitution does not erase state boundaries, but rather tracks
them. The people of each State obviously did trust their fate to the
people of the several States when they consented to the Constitution; not
only did they empower the governmental institutions of the
United States, but they also agreed to be bound by constitutional
amendments that they themselves refused to ratify. See Art. V .... At
the same time, however, the people of each State retained their
separate political identities. As Chief Justice Marshall put it,
"[n] o political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of break-
ing down the lines which separate the States, and of com-
pounding the American people into one common mass.'
4
On the other hand, Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court took a
more nationalist view of the founding.' 5 Stevens's opinion included the
10. See id. (KennedyJ., concurring) ("In one sense it is true that 'the people of each
State retained their separate political identities,' . . . for the Constitution takes care both to
preserve the States and to make use of their identities and structures at various points in
organizing the federal union.") (citation omitted).
11. Id. (KennedyJ., concurring) (arguing that, while states retained power, the entire
people of the United States "have a political identity as well, one independent of, though
consistent with, their identity as citizens of the State of their residence"). Justice Kennedy
added: "It must be recognized that '"[ft]or all the great purposes for which the Federal
government was formed, we are one people, with one common country."'" Id. (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (citations omitted).
12. Id. at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 1877 (Thomas,J., dissenting). Earlier in his dissent,Justice Thomas stated:
When they adopted the Federal Constitution, of course, the people of each State
surrendered some of their authority to the United States (and hence to entities
accountable to the people of other States as well as to themselves). They
affirmatively deprived their States of certain powers, see, e.g., Art I, § 10, and they
affirmatively conferred certain powers upon the Federal Government, see, e.g.,
Art. I, § 8. Because the people of the several States are the only true source of
power, however, the Federal Government enjoys no authority beyond what the
Constitution confers.
Id. at 1876 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 1877 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819)) (emphasis added).
15. See id. at 1855 ("[T]he Framers envisioned a uniform national system, rejecting
the notion that the Nation was a collection of States, and instead creating a direct link
between the National Government and the people of the United States.").
1996]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
claim that members of Congress "owe primary allegiance not to the
people of a State, but to the people of the Nation."'
6
The debate over the nature of the founding has spread beyond the
Supreme Court. Of course, the famous Contract with America"7 indicates
congressional interest in limiting the role of the national government.
Perhaps even more significant, however, are the fifteen recent state reso-
lutions reaffirming the Tenth Amendment, 18 which provides that "[t]he
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."19 Two hundred years after the founding, it is surely striking that
state governments see a need for such resolutions. The texts of these
resolutions suggest a fear that the national government misunderstands
the nature of the constitutional bargain struck in 1789. Frequently, the
national government is characterized as an "agent" of the states and is
accused of having violated the Tenth Amendment. 20 For example,
Arizona's legislative resolution stated that it would "serve as notice and
demand to the federal government, as our agent, to cease and desist,
effective immediately, mandates that are beyond the scope of its constitu-
tionally delegated powers."
2'
The nature of the founding is also a current academic favorite. Pro-
fessorial interest in "civic republicanism" is one example of this trend.
22
Bruce Ackerman's widely noticed book, We the People, is yet another exam-
ple.2 3 Still another version of the founding is embodied in Professor
16. Id.
17. See Contract with America 4 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) (one of
the "five principles to describe [the Republican] philosophy of American civilization" is
"limited government").
18. See DirkJohnson, Conspiracy Theories' Impact Reverberates in Legislatures, N.Y.
Times, July 6, 1995, at Al.
19. U.S. Const. amend. X.
20. See Johnson, supra note 18, at Al.
21. A Concurrent Resolution Regarding the Tenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Asserting the Sovereignty of the State of Arizona, H. R. Con. Res. 2015,
42d Leg., 1st Sess., 1995 Ariz. Legis. Serv. A-10 (West).
22. See, e.g., Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 Yale L.J. 1493 (1988).
23. See 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991) [hereinafter
Ackerman, We the People]. Professor Ackerman proposes a theory of dualist democracy
that distinguishes normal politics, which are transacted by representatives, and
constitutional politics, which involve the mass of citizens debating fundamental principles.
The "neither wholly national nor wholly federal" constitutional framework, Ackerman
argues,
deflates the claims of normal officials sitting either in Washington or in the states
to speak for the People .... The People, in contrast, reveal themselves only
through an amendment process [through which] we begin to hear the irregular,
but public-spirited and rational, voice of the citizenry, deliberating and deciding
on fundamental principle as they did during the conventions of the
Revolutionary era.
Id. at 185-86. According to Ackerman, transformative constitutional politics need not
involve Article V; the New Dealers, for example, "rejected the traditional form of an
[Vol. 96:121
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Akhil Amar's strongly nationalistic and democratic claim that the 1789
Constitution contemplated that a simple majority of 'We the People"
could amend the Constitution.
2 4
Given current interest in the relationship between state and national
power, it is important to examine Amar's claim and the amendment pro-
cess outlined in Article V in some detail. Article V clearly demonstrates
that, in requiring supermajorities to amend the Constitution and in en-
trenching state equality in the Senate, the original Constitution not only
envisaged the continued existence of the states as vital parts of the new
constitutional order, but also excluded the people from any direct role in
constitution-making.2 5
B. Article V
The place to begin, of course, is with the text of Article V itself.
2 6
The constitutional text clearly shows that the states were given the key
role in approving amendments to the charter of the national govern-
ment. The supermajority requirement further reinforces the distinctly
undemocratic features of the Constitution.
Article V was designed to permit a very small number of states (cur-
rently thirteen) containing but a fraction of the total national population
to block constitutional change. Constitutional amendments require both
initiation and approval by large supermajorities of Congress ("two thirds
of both Houses") 27 and of the states ("three fourths of the several
amendment" and instead relied on the Supreme Court "to elaborate their new activist
vision through a series of transformative opinions." Id. at 51-52.
24. See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 2; Amar, Philadelphia Revisited,
supra note 2. For a description of Professor Amar's theory, see infra Part II.
25. For an intriguing argument that House Rule XXI, which requires a three-fifths
vote to enact any tax increase, violates Article V's protection of state equality of suffrage in
the Senate, see Benjamin Lieber & Patrick Brown, Note, On Supermajorities and the
Constitution, 83 Geo. LJ. 2347 (1995).
26. Article V provides that:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the
one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress;
Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One
thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth
Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its
Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
U.S. Const. art. V.
27. See id.; see also National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920) (holding
that what is required is a "vote of two-thirds of the members present-assuming the




States"). 28 Amendments also require an interaction between Congress
and the several states. There is no role in the amending process for a
national "Ve the People of the United States." Even after all that, "no
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of equal Suffrage in the
Senate."
29
Federalist No. 39 has long been understood to provide the canonical
explanation for Article V's strongly state-centered (and counter-
majoritarian) process. In a famous passage, Madison states that:
[The Constitution] is neither wholly national nor wholly federal.
Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority
would reside in the majority of the people of the Union; and this
authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority
of every national society to alter or abolish its established gov-
ernment .... In requiring more than a majority, and particu-
larly in computing the proportion by States, not by citizens, it de-
parts from the national and advances towards the federal
character.3
0
In Federalist No. 43, Madison adds that Article V's amendment mechanism
"guards... against that extreme facility, which would render the Consti-
tution too mutable."
31
28. U.S. Const. art. V.
29. Id.
30. The Federalist No. 39, at 246 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
31. The Federalist No. 43, at 278 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
also The Federalist No. 85, at 526 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(noting difficulty of uniting requisite number of state legislatures to achieve amendments).
The difficulty of amending the Constitution through the Article V procedure has long
been a topic of intense debate. Over the years, numerous proposals have been advanced
to relax Article V's requirements, particularly with respect to the method of ratifying
amendments. See, e.g., William S. Livingston, Federalism and Constitutional Change
248-53 (1956) (noting numerous proposals to reform the amending procedure); Lester B.
Orfield, The Amending of the Federal Constitution 168-221 (Leonard W. Levy ed., Da
Capo Press 1971) (1942) (summarizing proposals made during the 1920s and 1930s to
improve Article V); John R. Vile, The Constitutional Amending Process in American
Political Thought 137-56 (1992) (discussing Progressive Era commentators' views on
amending process). For example, in 1891,John Burgess called the amending process the
"first" and "most important" of "three fundamental parts" of a complete constitution. See
1 John W. Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law 137 (1902).
According to Burgess, Article V "failed to accomplish the purpose for which it was
constructed"; he suggested an alternative system in which amendments proposed by two
successive sessions of Congress could be ratified by a simple majority of state legislatures.
See id. at 151-52.
The debate over the amendment process has receded substantially following Supreme
Court decisions sustaining the New Deal and subsequent civil rights legislation. Despite
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), it remains clear that virtually all desired
political, social, and economic change can now be achieved through ordinary legislation at
the national level. See Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication,
88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 730 (1988) (arguing that "lawyers often fail to appreciate that in
virtually every instance the imperatives of the new administrative state triump[h] over the
apparently limiting constitutional provisions"). This result has troubled many
commentators, generating wide-ranging debate over what are "proper" modes of
[Vol. 96:121
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Article V has been almost universally understood to be the exclusive
method for amending the Constitution. Recently, however, various ver-
sions of national popular sovereignty have been advanced as legitimate
substitutes. Bruce Ackerman's provocative and widely admired We the
People argues that at various "constitutional moments," "We the People"
have legitimately ignored Article V's state-centered amendment process
and amended the Constitution by ratifying decisions taken solely at the
national political level.32 Such a moment occurred in 1788, Ackerman
argues elsewhere, when the Constitution was ratified over objections that
its method of adoption was clearly illegal under the Articles of Confedera-
tion and several existing state constitutions.33
While Ackerman advocates amending Article V to institutionalize
more directly national popular sovereignty,3 4 his colleague, Professor
Akhil Amar, insists that no such amendment is necessary. In
"Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V,"
written in 1988, Amar argued that Article V was intended to restrict only
constitutional interpretation. Underpinning that debate has been the formal premise that,
in theory at least, a "crucial contrast [exists] between ordinary development by [judicial]
'interpretation' and extraordinary development by 'amendment.'" Sanford Levinson,
How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been Amended? (A) < 26; (B) 26;
(C) 27; (D) > 27: Accounting for Constitutional Change, in Responding to Imperfection:
The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment 13, 14-15 (Sanford Levinson ed.,
1995) [hereinafter Responding to Imperfection].
32. See Ackerman, We the People, supra note 23, at 51-52. Ackerman is responding
to a concern that he and I share, namely that much of the corpus of existing constitutional
law cannot be reconciled persuasively with original understanding. Professor Ackerman
makes no claim based upon an original understanding of the 1789 Constitution; he
acknowledges that the Framers viewed Article V as the exclusive mechanism for
constitutional change. His claim, rather, is grounded in American political practice. See
id. at 40-57, 175-99; cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously.
Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221,
1249-78 (1995) (criticizing Ackerman's work on textual and structural grounds).
However, Ackerman's theory does have implications for his view of constitutional history.
As he recently wrote, the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment demonstrated that,
after the Civil War, "We the People of the United States were now a nation that could
express itself politically on fundamental matters independently of the will of the individual
states." Bruce Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, in Responding to Imperfection, supra note
31, at 63, 78.
33. See generally Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62
U. Chi. L. Rev. 475 (1995) (a first rate account of the "illegality" of the founding, and the
extent to which Federalists used existing governmental institutions in unconventional
ways); cf. Thomas R. Powell, Changing Constitutional Phrases, 19 B.U. L. Rev. 509, 511
(1939) (arguing that the Constitution became legal only with its ratification by North
Carolina and Rhode Island).
34. Article V should be amended, Ackerman believes, to authorize amendment on the
basis of a national referendum if the amendment is proposed by a second term president
with the assent of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress and if it is ratified by three-fifths
of participating voters at the next two successive presidential elections. See Ackerman, We
the People, supra note 23, at 54-55. For criticism of this proposal, see Philip J. Weiser,
Note, Ackerman's Proposal for Popular Constitutional Lawmaking: Can It Realize His
Aspirations for Dualist Democracy?, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 907 (1993).
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organs of government, thereby expressing the "Peoples' " distrust of their
representatives.3 5 According to Amar, Article V was not intended to re-
strict the People of the United States; to the contrary, he insists that a
bare majority of the "People" can legally amend the Constitution without
regard to the mechanisms specified in the text.36 Six years later, in "The
Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article
V,"37 Amar announced that although he had "welcomed and waited for
refutation," he was now "more confident about [his] Article V conjecture
than [he] was in 1988."38 The Declaration of Independence and its
"evolving meaning between 1776 and 1789," he claims, lead to the con-
clusion that 'We the People of the United States have a legal right.., to
change our Constitution-via a majoritarian and populist mechanism
akin to a national referendum."39 "jW]ith apologies to Fermat," Amar
describes this theory of constitutional change as his "First Theorem."
40
Counterintuitive? Surely. Contrary to Supreme Court precedent?
Certainly.41 Contrary to the understanding of those who, over the last
two hundred years, have sought to liberalize formally the process of
amendment because they believed that Article V was exclusive? Indeed.
42
Historically correct nonetheless? No. Amar's engaging essays provide us
not with history but with his own political philosophy, one that has na-
tional popular sovereignty as its "First Theorem." Amar's claims about
Article V do, however, provide an excellent lens through which to ex-
35. See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 2, at 1054-55. The justification for
this narrow reading of Article V is only faintly made.
36. See id. at 1044.
37. See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 2.
38. Id. at 458. However, Amar does not mention two specific criticisms of his "Article
V conjecture." See David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The
Case of Article V, 76 Iowa L Rev. 1 (1990); John R. Vile, Legally Amending the United
States Constitution: The Exclusivity of Article V's Mechanisms, 21 Cumb. L. Rev. 271
(1991) [hereinafter Vile, Legally Amending].
39. Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 2, at 457.
40. Id. at 458.
41. See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956) ("Nothing new can be put
into the Constitution except through the amendatory process. Nothing old can be taken
out without the same process."); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920) (invalidating an
Ohio state constitutional provision requiring a popular referendum on proposed
amendments to the United States Constitution, and noting that "[t]he framers of the
Constitution might have adopted a different method. Ratification [of proposed
constitutional amendments] might have been left to a vote of the people.. . ."); Dodge v.
Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 348 (1855) (observing that the Constitution "is supreme
over the people of the United States, aggregately and in their separate sovereignties,
because they have excluded themselves from any direct or immediate agency in making
amendments to it, and have directed that amendments should be made representatively
for them").
42. See supra note 31.
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amine the issue that so troubled Justices Kennedy and Thomas in Term
Limits, i.e., the nature of the founding.
4 3
Part II of this Article describes Amar's textual and historical claims.
Part III shows that Amar's nationally defined "We the People" ignores the
central feature of the constitutional order established in 1789: federal-
ism. At its creation, the American Constitution rested upon two pillars:
namely, "We the People" (nationally understood) and the several states
(i.e., "We the People" thereof) as independent political communities.4
The result was a constitutional order that, as Madison stated, was "neither
wholly national nor wholly federal."4 The state-centered Article V rein-
forces that dualism. To be sure, as Justice Thomas observed, the "people
of each state ... did trust their fate" in the new union to the people of
other states by agreeing "to be bound by constitutional amendments that
they themselves refused to ratify,"46 but they did so only on the premise
that Article V's requirements would make it very difficult to change the
terms according to which the states came together. More specifically, Ar-
tide V was intended to prevent a simple majority concentrated in a few
population-rich states from altering the terms of the union.47 It defies
belief to suppose that when Delaware or any other state entered into the
union-irrevocably so, Amar elsewhere tells us 48-its citizens understood
that a bare majority of a national "We the People" (that is, people resid-
43. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995); see also supra text
accompanying notes 9-11 (discussingJustice Kennedy's concurrence in Tern Limits).
44. The Constitution "erected a new central government on the hitherto unheard-of
dual foundation of the states as integral political entities and the people as the ultimate
constituent source of power." Thornton Anderson, Creating the Constitution: The
Convention of 1787 and the First Congress 13 (1993). Of course, that dual foundation has
been attacked by strong nationalists throughout our history, including Chief Justice
Marshall. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404 (1819) ("[T]he
People were at perfect liberty to accept or reject [the Constitution]; and their act was final.
It required not the affirmance, and could not be negatived, by the State governments.");
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (noting that the "original and
supreme will [of the people] organizes the government").
45. The Federalist No. 39, at 246 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
46. US. Term Limits, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 1877 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
47. "[Amar's claim] could mean that if the citizens of, say, Texas, California, New
York, Florida, and Illinois voted overwhelmingly to ratify, it would not matter that mere
majorities of voters in the other... states voted against ratification." Dow, supra note 38,
at 30. Under Article V, alteration of the relationship among the peoples of the several
states can occur only through action by a "nationally distributed majority, though one that
legally could consist of a bare numerical majority." Martin Diamond, Democracy and The
Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent, 53 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 52, 57 (1959);
see also Martin Diamond et al., The Democratic Republic: An Introduction to American
National Government 99 (1966) (stating that the practical effect of Article V is to "require
nationally distributed majorities," which ensures "that no amendment could be passed with
the support of a few populous states").
48. See Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale LJ. 1425, 1462 (1987)
[hereinafter Amar, Sovereignty]. But see Forrest McDonald, Novo Ordo Seclorum: The
Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 281 (1985) (possibility that secession is
constitutionally legitimate was acknowledged by Gouverneur Morris and other Founders).
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ing in other states) could terminate their state's very existence. Article V
was a vital part of a larger design that ensured that, in the new constitu-
tional order, the individual states would remain independent and impor-
tant political communities, and that the terms of their union with one
another could be altered only if substantial obstacles were overcome. 49
Additionally, Part III continues the investigation of Amar's claim
through the generation subsequent to the Founders. It argues that 'Ve
the People" accounts of Article V's non-exclusivity were not part of our
pre-Civil War national constitutional jurisprudence. From 1787 to 1861,
judges and commentators assumed that the relative mix between 'We the
People of the United States" and "We the People of the States United"
could be altered only in accordance with Article V.
Part IV examines the democracy-restraining nature of the
Constitution, viewing Article V as an important part of the Framers' ef-
forts to slow democracy. This Part's purpose rejects an overly
majoritarian conception of the original Constitution which seeks support
in general slogans such as "We the People" and "popular sovereignty."
Indeed, in 1789, the phrase "We the People" was understood to represent
the source of political authority, not the mode of its exercise; popular sover-
eignty is not once mentioned in the Constitution. Furthermore, numer-
ous scholars have described the Constitution in anti-democratic terms. It
is simply a reality that the Constitution was far from a majoritarian docu-
ment-the Constitution itself does not contemplate any form of direct,
unmediated lawmaking by the people-and its status as perhaps the most
democratic document of its time cannot hide this fact.
Finally, Part V briefly raises concerns about the contemporary desir-
ability of Amar's "We the Majority"50 amendment theory. In an elec-
tronic age, "call-in" democracy is becoming increasingly feasible. That
may not be good news.
II. AMAR's CLAIM: NATIONAL PoPuLAR SOVEREIGNTY
One might ask why, given both the diversity of views expressed about
the nature of the founding and my claim that Amar's argument is histori-
cally unsound, I have chosen to devote such attention to his arguments. I
could, for example, discuss Bruce Ackerman, who also presents an unor-
thodox view of the amending process.51 In my opinion, it is Amar's argu-
ments in particular that merit response. First, Ackerman purports to find
legitimate constitutional change in the contemporary political consent of
"We the People"; Amar, by contrast, attempts to enlist the traditional
49. "[A]s it is implemented in the United States, the federal principle refutes the
principle of majority rule as applied to the problem of constitutional amendment."
Livingston, supra note 31, at 247.
50. I use the term "We the Majority" throughout to describe a subset of "We the
People," i.e., the bare numerical majority which Amar believes is sufficient to effect
constitutional change.
51. See supra notes 23, 32.
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trappings of constitutional legitimacy-historical support and original
understanding. In the "legitimacy" of ungrounded history, many bad
ideas find their genesis.52 Second, as noted above, the relevance of this
debate is highlighted by the fact that the outcome of recent important
Supreme Court cases has turned upon judicial understandings of the
original understanding of federalism. Thus, in this Part, I set forth
Amar's arguments, noting and critiquing first his textual claims, and sec-
ond, his historical ones.
A. Amar's Textual Claims
Amar's central claim is that the Constitution "empowers and limits
government, [but] it neither limits nor empowers the People them-
selves." 53 Specifically, he suggests that a properly called convention or
two-thirds of both Houses of Congress could submit amendments to di-
rect popular vote; moreover, he contends that Congress must call a con-
vention upon the request of a bare majority of American voters.54 "Once
this transcendent principle [of national popular sovereignty] is accepted,
we are driven to the arresting conclusion that ... article V is neither
necessary nor indeed always sufficient for legitimate constitutional
[change] .,5
To support "We the Majority's" amending power, Amar makes vari-
ous textual claims. He first argues that the terms of Article V apply only
to governmentally proposed amendments, and, to establish this, he draws
upon the language of the Preamble and the First, Ninth, and Tenth
Amendments. 56 Standing alone, the textual arguments are clearly insub-
stantial. To restrict Article V to governmentally sponsored amendments
is to impose a limitation that the Article does not facially contain.57 Amar
52. See, e.g., Barbara O'Brien, Scary New 'Isms' at the Speed of Light, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 30, 1995, at A17 (describing historical "facts" asserted by various fringe political
groups, including the theory that the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to African-
Americans).
53. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 2, at 1055. Amar's claim is, of course,
one about "right," not about "power." See Dow, supra note 38, at 54-55 (The question of
power "lies in history and on the battlefield," while an argument that the people can alter
the government outside of Article V is "quite specifically a point about rights.").
54. See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 2, at 1044-45, 1061, 1065.
55. Id. at 1071. Practically, of course, this means that what "Amar has done is bypass,
for ratification purposes, the states." Dow, supra note 38, at 30. Of course, this
understanding of popular sovereignty would permit the majority to disregard any provision
of the Constitution. See id. at 32 n.155; see also Akhil R. Amar, The Central Meaning of
Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator
Problem, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 749 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Republican Government]
(carrying his claim still further by adding the Guarantee Clause to his arsenal). In view of
what is said herein, no additional discussion of the Guarantee Clause is necessary.
56. See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 2, at 1046.
57. Indeed, it directly contradicts the views of those who believe that Article V was the
most revolutionary aspect of the proposed constitution. Heretofore, constitutions either
provided no such mechanism, or the amendment processes were, like that of the Articles
1996]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
proposes to overcome this difficulty by noting that Article V does not ex-
plicitly say that it prescribes the "only" amending process.58 The process
of constitutional interpretation would be paralyzed if the simple absence
of the qualifier "only" meant that a clause was not "exclusive," as Profes-
sor Tribe persuasively shows.59 Nor is this a new insight. Marbuiy v.
Madison long ago rejected such an interpretation. 60 Justice Story also
wrote that "[t] here can be no doubt, that an affirmative grant of powers
... will imply an exclusion of all others."
61
Equally unavailing is Amar's reference to the language of the
Preamble's "We the People." Even assuming that this phrase fully incor-
porated a conception of a national 'e the People," itself a controversial
proposition, that language, standing alone, cannot dispel the inference
that Article V was intended to prescribe the exclusive vehicle for the exer-
cise of whatever sovereignty the national people possessed.62 There is,
after all, nothing textually incoherent about reading the Preamble and
Article V together, and of course it is customary to read a text so as to give
meaning to all of its parts.
The same analysis applies to Amar's references to the "people" in the
Ninth and Tenth (and the First, Second, and Fourth) Amendments.
63
of Confederation, unworkable. See, e.g., Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of American
Constitutionalism 110 (1988); Dow, supra note 38, at 32 n.157 (only six of the 13 state
constitutions passed after the Declaration of Independence included mechanisms for
amendment).
58. See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 2, at 1054.
59. See Tribe, supra note 32, at 1241-45, 1273-76. Term Limits subsequently
endorsed an analysis similar to Tribe's with respect to Article 1, § 2. See U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1856 (1995) ("[T]he Qualifications Clauses were
intended to... fix as exclusive the qualifications in the Constitution.").
60. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) ("Affirmative words are often, in their
operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a negative or
exclusive sense must be given to them or they have no operation at all."). Indeed, in
defending Marbury's interpretation of the clause defining the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction, Amar himself found that the clause was exclusive, even though it does not
explicitly say that it is. See Akhil R. Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 443, 464 (1989).
61. 3Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 207, at
155 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833).
62. In "Philadelphia Revisited," Amar relies upon the ratification mode specified in
Article VII. See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 2, at 1047-54. In "Consent of the
Governed," Amar retreats somewhat from these arguments, but continues to maintain that
"majoritarian popular sovereignty principles are clearly part of the U.S. Constitution...
whether one focuses on the very act of ordainment and establishment or on the texts."
Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 2, at 458. However, even if we admit that "We
the People" of the United States possess some element of national sovereignty, there is
nothing to suggest that they can exercise it in a manner inconsistent with Article V.
63. I treat the Bill of Rights here as part of the original Constitution of 1789. Of
course, such a concession need not be made. Amar's reference to the Tenth Amendment
is rather ironic. In the past that amendment has been invoked to support limits on the
content of amendments that could be proposed under Article V. See John R. Vile,
Contemporary Questions Surrounding the Constitutional Amending Process 131-32
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Amar, it should be noted, does not invoke these amendments as implicit
modifications of Article V, as others have done. 64 Rather, his claim is that
the amendments simply underscore the importance of national popular
sovereignty in the original understanding. This claim is especially
troublesome. 65 These amendments were state-centered, not nation-cen-
tered; they emerged from sustained efforts by the ratifying states to pre-
serve state autonomy against what was perceived to be a powerful national
government.66 It is, therefore, very far from clear that the (lower-cased)
"people" referred to in the Bill of Rights are the same as the grand (up-
per-cased) "People" in the Preamble's "We the People of the United
States" (if nationally understood).67
The very best that can be said of Amar's textual argument is that one
or more of the provisions he cites might bear the construction he puts on
them. To show that they do bear that understanding, however, Professor
Amar is forced to look beyond the constitutional text and to consider the
contemporary understanding of these provisions.
B. Amar's Historical Claims
What is Amar's historical case? The argument is quite straightfor-
ward. Beginning with the Declaration of Independence (which, Amar
recognizes, proclaimed only a right of revolution, not a right of amend-
ment by "We the Majority"), Amar argues that the concept of popular
sovereignty had evolved by 1789 into a general understanding that a
(1993) [hereinafter Vile, Contemporary Questions]. Amar's argument is, moreover,
plainly wrong because the Tenth Amendment "reserved only the non-delegated powers,
whereas the amending power had been previously delegated." Orfield, supra note 31, at
109; cf. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct at 1854 (concluding that Framers intended Constitution to
be exclusive source of qualifications for Congress, and thus " 'divested states' of any power
to add qualifications").
64. See, e.g., Selden Bacon, How the Tenth Amendment Affected the Fifth Article of
the Constitution, 16 Va. L. Rev. 771, 780 (1930) (arguing that the Tenth Amendment shut
the "loop-hole of power to wipe out... liberties completely and conditionally" that Article
V, as written, left open).
65. Orfield, in a discussion of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, observes that
"[n]either amendment confers any affirmative powers on the people, nor clarifies the
meaning of the word. Sovereignty or the power to amend can scarcely be derived from
them." Orfield, supra note 31, at 144.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 191-197. The Second Amendment, for
example, refers only to state militias; its "people," therefore, are state-centered. See, e.g.,
Gary Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. Rev. Books, Sept. 21, 1995, at 62, 64 (specific
language of Second Amendment was designed "to emphasize the state's separate militias"
as opposed to the defense of the nation); see also Raoul Berger, Federalism: The
Founders' Design 77-85 (1987) (strongly espousing a state-centered view of the purpose of
the Tenth Amendment).
67. Whether "the people" of the Preamble are the same as "the people" of the
amendments has divided commentators. See, e.g., Orfield, supra note 31, at 103 n.46.
Amar assumes that they are, going to the extent of capitalizing al his references to the
people. See, e.g., Amar, Republican Government, supra note 55, at 16.
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simple majority of the people could alter the frame of state government
whenever it so wished. Numerous supportive citations are given.
68
Now to the crucial claim: Amar argues that when 'We the People" of
the separate states ratified the Constitution and became part of a consoli-
dated "We the People" of the United States, the state-developed under-
standing of popular sovereignty, which increasingly had recognized the
right of a bare majority of citizens to amend the state constitutions, be-
came an attribute of the national people. 69 The new Constitution em-
bodied the principle of national popular sovereignty, a principle that, in
turn, gave "We the (National) Majority" the authority to change the
frame of the national government. 70 This is the heart of the argument.
Various flourishes are added in support, such as the impossibility of an
impefium in imperio, i.e., a state within a state, 71 and the inalienability of
the sovereignty of "We the People." 72 In "Consent of the Governed,"
Amar also produces James Wilson, the Pennsylvania statesman, as the
eighteenth-century champion of his version of original understanding.
73
Amar's Article V claim simply extends an argument he made in an
earlier article that also wholly ignores the federal character of the found-
ing.74 Amar believes that "the so-called 'United States' were really sepa-
rate nations in 1787-much as the so-called 'United Nations' are to-
day."75 This position mirrors strongly state-centered accounts of the
founding,76 such as those written by Justice Clarence Thomas and
Professor Raoul Berger, which in one form or another insist that the
68. See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 2, at 481-87. None of the
quotations Amar uses appear in the context of Article V; rather, all suggest that the
ratification of the Constitution violated state law or the Articles of Confederation. See id.
at 486-87 & n.113.
69. See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 2, at 1062 ("[A]fter Massachusetts
adopted the Constitution ... sovereignty was relocated to The People of the United States,
as a whole.").
70. See id. at 1047-66.
71. See id. at 1063 (at the time of the Constitution's ratification, "[d]ivided
sovereignty was almost universally recognized as a theoretical impossibility... 'imperium in
imperio... [is a] solecism' ").
72. See id. at 1050 (fundamental principle of American government was that "the
People were sovereign, and that a majority of them enjoyed the inalienable legal right...
to alter or abolish their form of government whenever they pleased").
73. See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 2, at 474-75, 506-07. On Wilson,
see infra note 88.
74. See Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 48, at 1437 (arguing that Constitution
embodies the idea that true sovereignty lies in the People of the United States).
75. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 2, at 1049; see also Amar, Sovereignty,
supra note 48, at 1460 (Before ratification, "the People of each state were indeed
sovereign.").
76. One such state-centered account is given by Patrick Henry: "The assent of the
people in their collective capacity is not necessary to the formation of a Federal
Government." Patrick Henry, Speech (June 5, 1788) in The Anti-Federalist Papers and the
Constitutional Convention Debates 196, 207 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986).
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states preceded "We the People of the United States.177 Unlike Thomas
and Berger, however, Amar argues that in ratifying the Constitution in
1789, the "previously separate state Peoples agreed to 'consolidate' them-
selves into a single continental People [and] ... to reconstitute them-
selves into one common sovereignty."78 The "most important thing that
the Constitution constitutes is neither the national government, nor even
the supreme law, but one sovereign national People, who may alter their
government or supreme law at will." 79 If this is so, it follows that Article V
too is subordinate to the will of "one sovereign national People."
However, Amar's two-stage description is internally inconsistent. His
stage one account, that prior to ratification the peoples of the various
states stood as foreign nations to one another, presents difficulties.80 If,
as he also claims, sovereignty of the people is inalienable,8' how could the
people of any independent state permanently bind future peoples of the
same state to the will of a national "We the People"? Amar, in short,
cannot explain his rejection of secession.8 2 If, on the other hand, 'We
the People" of Maryland could in 1789 alienate some of their sovereignty,
why cannot "We the People" of the United States alienate their sover-
eignty to the extent prescribed by Article V.
Moreover, Amar's description of when a national "We the People"
emerged fits badly both with what we know of the period between 1775
and 1788,83 and with the text of the Preamble, which seems to assume the
prior existence of a "We the People" of the United States.84 It is clearly
inconsistent with the strongly nationalist opinions of Chief Justice
Marshall, which posit the existence of a national "We the People" prior to
the adoption of the Constitution.8 5 Indeed, even before Marshall, that
77. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1875 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Berger, supra note 66, at 21-47.
78. Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 48, at 1460. Berger rejects these implications. See
Berger, supra note 66, at 48-76.
79. Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 48, at 1463 n.163.
80. See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 2, at 1062 ("In 1787, each state was
an independent nation.").
81. See id. at 1050.
82. See id at 1076. In "Philadelphia Revisited," Amar contends that the long-
moribund People who adopted the Constitution could never bind future generations to it.
See id. at 1072. Yet it seems that that is precisely what the People of the individual states
were doing if, as Amar argues, they transferred state sovereignty to the People of the
United States and that sovereignty, once transferred, became inalienable. See id. at 1050.
83. See, e.g., Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 33, at 487-539 (describing the Framers'
use of existing national institutions to achieve their goals).
84. See U.S. Const. pmbl.
85. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819); see also Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 324 (1816). For Marshall, the fact that the
Constitution was ratified by the people voting in their separate states at conventions was a
natural administrative convenience. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402-04.
Professor Beer, a strongly nationalistic writer, endorses a similar criticism of Amar's claims.
Beer objects that Amar's claims "jar[ ] with one's knowledge of how a people, a nation,
actually comes into existence and with the record of how that happened in America."
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conception had surfaced in Supreme Court opinions.8 6 And Amar's
views also conflict with those of his newly found champion, James Wil-
son.8 7 Wilson apparently "thought of the electorate not in terms of the
states but in terms of the whole: as a single, sovereign entity, 'the people
of the United States.' "88 Federalist Thomas Pickering presented that
perspective very clearly: "The people of the United States form one nation
... altho [ugh] for the more easy and advantageous management of partic-
ular districts, the people have formed themselves into 13 separate commu-
nities, or states."89
For us, however, Amar's second stage assumption, national "consoli-
dation" as a result of ratification, is even more important. Here, Amar's
claims for the constitutional prerogatives of "We the [National] Majority"
extend well beyond those of other devotees of national popular sover-
eignty, who believe that popular sovereignty operates behind and above
the Constitution.90 Amar believes that the Constitution itself legally in-
cludes an overriding principle of national popular sovereignty.
Samuel H. Beer, To Make a Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism 321 (1993).
Beer, indeed, wants to locate the emergence of a national "We the People" no later than
the revolutionary era. See id. at 322.
86. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236 (1796) ("There can be no limitation
on the power of the people of the United States. By their authority, the state constitutions
were made, and by their authority the constitution of the United States was
established .... "); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 470-71 (1793) (Jay, CJ.) ("the
people, in their collective and national capacity, established the present Constitution"); id.
at 454 (Wilson, J.) (the people "might have announced themselves 'sovereign' people of
the United States: but serenely conscious of the fact, they avoided the ostentatious
declaration").
87. See infra text accompanying notes 177-187
88. Robert G. McCloskey, James Wilson in 1 The Justices of the United States
Supreme Court 1789-1969, at 79, 88 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1989); see also
Anderson, supra note 44, at 48-50; Geoffrey Seed, James Wilson 79 (1978); Marci A.
Hamilton, Discussion and Decisions; 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 477, 531 n.237 (1994). Wilson,
most of the time at least, seems to have believed that a national "We the People" existed
prior to the adoption of the Constitution, and that it was "subdivided" for some purposes
into 13 states. A founding father and AssociateJustice of the Supreme Court, Wilson was
perhaps the premier legal thinker of his generation.
89. Michael Kammen, Sovereignty and Liberty: Constitutional Discourse in American
Culture 22 (1988). See generally id. at 20-37 (discussing conception of popular
sovereignty following independence). For other references to a national "We the People,"
see id. at 22 n.23.
90. A devotee second to none, Professor Samuel Beer, writes: "This constituent
sovereign, one must emphasize, was not limited by positive law, not even by the law of the
Constitution defining how the Constitution was to be amended, since that law too had
been made by the constituent sovereign and so presumably could be overruled by it."
Beer, supra note 85, at 338. As E.S. Corwin has remarked, the amending power, like all
other powers organized in the Constitution, is "a delegated, and hence a limited power."
Edward S. Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today 177 (12th ed. Atheneum
1965) (1920). "The one power known to the Constitution which clearly is not limited by it
is that which ordains it-in other words, the original, inalienable power of the people of
the United States to determine their own political institutions." Id. Like Corwin, upon
whom he relies, Beer simply proclaims his conclusion. See Henry P. Monaghan, The
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Amar's "consolidation" (i.e., national popular sovereignty) claim is
clearly inconsistent with Madison in Federalist No. 39,91 and with Hamilton
in Federalist No. 32, who goes out of his way to deny that any such com-
plete "consolidation" among the peoples of the several states was in-
tended.92 As Justice Kennedy recognized in Term Limits, a difference ex-
ists between "complete" and "partial" consolidation. 93 That distinction
was well understood by the Founders. Herbert Storing, a widely
respected student of the era, wrote that during ratification even the Fed-
eralists generally "conceded the historical and legal priority of the
states."
9 4
Amar's description is also completely contrary to strongly state-
centered descriptions of the founding. Like Justice Thomas in Term
Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 11 n.44 (1993) (criticizing the
lack of analytical rigor in Corwin's work). One searches in vain for any historical analysis
of original understanding. No contact-none-is made with the standard American
historical works, to say nothing of original source material. As with Corwin, Beer's reliance
upon the existence of a national "We the People" comes at the cost of ignoring the
founding era's deep commitment to the importance of the states as political communities.
Finally, neither writer devotes even one sentence to the institutional implications of their
claims for officials (particularly judges) who take an oath to support "this Constitution."
Moreover, there is also a lack of clarity in their claims. Does their view entail the
conclusion that "the people of the United States" inexorably means "We the Majority"?
Beer and Corwin's lack of clarity is, perhaps, explicable because, unlike Amar, they
apparently view popular sovereignty as operating "behind" the constitutional framework,
not as a legally operative part of that constitutional order.
91. See The Federalist No. 39, at 243-46 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). Just prior to the convention, Madison wrote to Washington, stating his belief that
"an individual independence of the States is utterly irreconcilable with the idea of national
sovereignty." Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), in 9
Papers ofJames Madison 382, 383 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975).
92. See The Federalist No. 32, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (explaining that "plan of the convention aim[ed] only at a partial union or
consolidation").
93. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1854 (1995) (KennedyJ.,
concurring).
94. Herbert J. Storing, The 'Other' Federalist Papers: A Preliminary Sketch, 6 Pol.
Sci. Reviewer 215, 220 (1976); see also Berger, supra note 66, at 33, 50-55 (citing remarks
by prominent Federalist Chief Justice Marshall). Marshall, whose opinions on the issue
generally have a strongly nationalist ring, captured the point in Sturges v. Crowinnshield,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819):
[I] t was neither necessary nor proper to define the powers retained by the States.
These powers proceed, not from the people of America, but from the people of
the several States; and remain, after the adoption of the constitution, what they




Limits,95 Forrest McDonald claims that, even after 1789, "We the People"
were understood only as "We the People of the Several States."
96
To my eyes, neither completely state-centered nor completely nation-
alist views of the founding capture the original understanding. I believe
that Madison got the dominant understanding right.97 A significant
number of Americans simultaneously held-in varying mixtures and
intensities-some concept of a "We the People" of the United States and
(more importantly for my argument) some concept of a "We the People"
of Delaware, and so on.98 Federalism, not national consolidation, was the
defining feature of the Constitution of 1787. The "Constitution presup-
poses that 'the people' have at least two identities: as members of states
and as members of the United States."99 This condition necessarily ex-
95. See Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1876 n.1 (Thomas,J, dissenting) (original Preamble
to Constitution, which read "We the People of the States of New-Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Rhode-Island [etc.]" was" "clearer"-style committee's subsequent change to
"We the People of the United States" "did not work a substantive change in the
Constitution").
96. See McDonald, supra note 48, at 280-81 (states were "thirteen political
societies"). McDonald echoes the state-centered account of the founding expressed by St.
George Tucker in 1803 in the first famous exposition on the meaning of the Constitution.
Tucker wrote that the states are "constituent and necessary parts of the federal
government," without which "there could be neither a senate, nor a president." St. George
Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1 Blackstone's Commentaries
app. note D, at 140, 141-42 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803); see also Berger, supra note 66,
at 29-35, 58-76.
97. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 39, at 243 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (ratification was by "We the People" of the states). Tench Coxe, an ardent
Federalist, wrote that although
the convention propose [s] that it should be the act of the people, yet it is in their
capacities as citizens of the several members of our confederac-for they are expressly
declared to be 'the people of the United States'- . . . and the general term of
America, which is constantly used in speaking of us as a nation, is carefully omitted:
a pointed view was evidently had to our existing union.
Tench Coxe, A Freeman I (Jan. 23, 1788), in 15 The Documentary History of the
Ratification of the Constitution 453, 456-57 (John P. Kaminski & GaspareJ. Saldino eds.,
1984) [hereinafter Documentary History].
98. Some evidence of the range of conceptions that were held can be found in the
multiple meanings given to the word "state." As Madison noted, the word "state" appears
to have several different meanings in the Constitution. SeeJames Madison, The Report of
1800 (Jan. 7, 1800), in 17 Papers ofJames Madison, supra note 91, 307, 308-09. In his
definition of the term "states," Madison included "the people composing those political
societies, in their highest sovereign capacity." Id. at 309. In this sense, Madison said "all
will at least concur that" the states were parties to the Constitution. See id.; see also Texas
v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 720-21 (1869) (discussing various meanings of the word
"state"); Wayne D. Moore, Reconceiving Interpretive Autonomy: Insights from the
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 11 Const. Commentary 315, 333-41 (1994).
99. Moore, supra note 98, at 352; see, e.g.,James Madison, Remarks in Debate in the
House of Representatives (August 15, 1789), in 1 Debates and Proceedings in the Congress
of the United States 766, 766-67 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (speech in the first Congress on
whether the people's right to instruct their representatives should be included in the
Constitution). Madison opposed the right to instruct on the ground that "sovereignty" was
held by the people as a whole, not "detached bodies" of them. See id. at 767.
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isted in a constitutional order "neither wholly national nor wholly
federal."00
Even if, however, we were to concede that Amar provides the best
account of when a national "We the People" of the United States legally
(i.e., constitutionally) came into existence, 101 the crucial question is what
understanding of sovereignty actually existed in 1789. Contrary to what
Amar claims, the understanding was not that "consolidation" had oc-
curred and that any parallel conception of "We the People of New
Hampshire, etc." had been eliminated. The reality was considerable con-
fusion, not a first theorem.' 0 2 "Men were always only half aware of where
their thought was going .... ,u10
On one point, however, there was no confusion. No one believed
that a simple majority of people (however defined) in population-rich
states could amend the national Constitution. Any such claim ignores the
most important structural characteristic of the Founders' Constitution:
federalism, which, as Herbert Wechsler wrote, "was the means and price
of the formation of the Union."10 4 Moreover, Amar's exaltation of the
prerogatives of 'We the People" cannot be reconciled with the founding
generation's abiding fear of the excesses of democracy.10 5
III. THE AMENDING PROCESS IN 1787
The Constitutional Convention is surely among the best places to
begin an examination of original understanding. It is true that the pro-
ceedings in the Constitutional Convention were largely unknown to the
ratifiers, and I believe that claims for their interpretive significance can
readily be exaggerated. 10 6 Nonetheless, the debates generally constitute
some evidence of the general understanding at the time of the ratifica-
100. The Federalist No. 39, at 246 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). A
powerful argument exists that, in reality, Amar's strongly nationalistic "We the People"
comes into historical existence only at the conclusion of the Civil War, if then.
101. This part of Amar's thesis is addressed in Berger, supra note 66, at 48-50 (setting
forth argument that the Constitution represented a recognition of national supremacy
over state sovereignty). However, Berger goes on to dismantle this argument. See id. at
51-76.
102. "I cannot say whether popular sovereignty is most sensibly referred to as a theory,
a concept, or simply a shifting set of attitudes." Kammen, supra note 89, at 14; see also id.
at 24-25 (in 1789, many people believed that once people transfer power to officials, it
may be reclaimed only for abuse).
103. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 889
(1969). Wood is speaking of the sovereignty of the people and noting that the "new ideas
about politics were not the products of extended reasoned analysis .... " Id.
104. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev.
543, 543 (1954).
105. See infra Part IV.
106. See Monaghan, supra note 31, at'725 ("The Framers themselves did not intend




tion, particularly because many of the Convention's members took to the
field to defend the proposed new constitutional order. The debates are
unmistakably clear on the nature of the founding: The defining issue in
the Convention was "Our Federalism." 10 7 That question also dominated
the ratification debates. Both show that Madison's account of the nature
of the new constitutional order got the matter quite right: The
Constitution established a greatly strengthened national government that
stopped far short of national consolidation.
A. The Convention
1. Defeat of the Strong Nationalists. - Thornton Anderson's admi-
rable recent study sorts the individual delegates to the Constitutional
Convention into three groups: strong nationalists, such as Madison,
Hamilton, Wilson, and Gouverneur Morris; die-hard states-rightists, such
as Martin, Lansing, and Yates; and moderate nationalists, who were the
bulk of the delegates (particularly of those from Connecticut and
Delaware). The moderate nationalists were prepared to strengthen the
authority of the national government, but they also insisted upon the im-
portance of maintaining the states as independent political societies in
the new constitutional order.'08 The strong nationalists were concerned
with the disintegration of the national government and the excesses of
democracy; because of population disparity, they disliked the provision in
the Articles of Confederation for state voting equality. 10 9 Hamilton and
Wilson were strong nationalists, and they remained so throughout their
careers.110 We do not now remember Madison as such. Recalling his
contributions to The Federalist, his authorship and subsequent defense of
the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, and his presidency, we picture a more
state-centered founder. But that was a post-1787 Madison. At the Con-
vention, Madison was a strong nationalist."' He arrived with the belief
107. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). On some other matters the
delegates were united, especially on the need to protect property against the "ravages" of
state legislatures: "The men of Philadelphia were, without exception, men of property."
Jack I Pole, Introduction, in The American Constitution: For and Against 1, 11 (Jack R.
Pole ed., 1987). The debates in the Convention were real, but they were of the "haves
versus the haves" variety. Richard K. Matthews, If Men Were Angels: James Madison and
the Heartless Empire of Reason 185 (1995).
108. See Anderson, supra note 44, at 7-8. Several historical accounts emphasize the
"nationalism" of the Convention. See, e.g., William P. Murphy, The Triumph of
Nationalism (1967) (arguing that the Framers were more nationalist then is generally
acknowledged by historians). These accounts are valuable, but they are seriously
incomplete. They ignore the Convention's recognition of the central and continuing
importance of the states as independent political communities.
109. See Anderson, supra note 44, at 44-50.
110. See M.E. Bradford, Founding Fathers 39-49, 87-94 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter
Bradford, Founding Fathers] (biographical sketches of Hamilton and Wilson).
111. Lance Banning disputes this in a recent book, arguing that Madison did not
significantly alter his views after the Convention. See Evan Comog, The Federalist: A New
Look at the MisunderstoodJames Madison and How He Shaped the Republic, N.Y. Times,
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that "only the creation of an effective national government would rescue
the states from their own failings."" 2 The "ground of [Madison's]
thought had shifted, away from the weaknesses of the Union and toward
the problems of the states.""13 The "problems of the states" were, of
course, the democratic excesses of the state legislatures."
14
Led by Madison and Wilson, the nationalists opened the Convention
with a strong assault upon state prerogative. The states would not be
eliminated, of course, but in practical terms they would be reduced to
"subordinately useful" administrative districts. 15 The nationalists wanted
representation in the Senate based upon population, a congressional veto
of all state legislation, and congressional authority to legislate "in all cases
to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of
the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual
Oct. 29, 1995, § 7 (Book Review), at 39, 39 (reviewing Lance Banning, The Sacred Fire of
Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the Federal Republic (1995)) ("Attempting
to assign reasons for Madison's change of heart is futile, because no such change took
place.... Madison was not.., an ardent nationalist in the early 1780's, as most recent
historians have believed."). Even if this is true, Madison was a strong nationalist in the
Convention when compared with other members.
112. Jack N. Rakove, James Madison and the Creation of the American Republic 44
(Oscar Handlin ed., 1990). Richard Matthews provides a splendid, if ultimately
unsympathetic view of Madison's thought. See Matthews, supra note 107, at 7-8.
Madison's stance reflected his underlying pessimism. A liberal in the (atomistic) Hobbes-
Locke mode, Madison's overarching concern was with governmental stability; he sought to
ward off dangers to property and the inevitable forces of decay. Madison was quite unlike
eitherJefferson or Hamilton in that sense. The latter had positive visions: Jefferson of a
"democratic pastoral republic"; Hamilton of a "liberal-elite, heroic empire." Id.
113. Rakove, supra note 112, at 47; see also Matthews, supra note 107, at 130-45
(discussing Madison's fear during ratification that populist forces within states could
undermine the new Constitution's validity by forcing a second convention or conditioning
ratification on a bill of rights).
114. See Rakove, supra note 112, at 45. Matthews writes:
Two interrelated problems constituted the core of Madison's assessment: the
weakness of the federal government and the ineffectiveness of the state
governments in controlling the actions of majorities and therein failing to protect
the property rights of individuals. Madison's perception of the democratic nature
of the legislative bodies in the various states as a primary defect in the
Confederation goes a long way to explain his specific political prescriptions prior
to the 1790s.
Matthews, supra note 107, at 178.
115. Matthews, supra note 107, at 186. Writing to George Washington just prior to
the Convention, Madison acknowledged that "a consolidation of the states into one simple
republic would be as inexpedient as it is unattainable." Letter, supra note 91, at 383. He
advocated instead a "middle ground," one that would "at once support a due supremacy of
the national authority, and not exclude the local authorities wherever they can be
subordinately useful." Id. Compare Madison's defense of the states as a check on the
national government in Federalist No. 51, with his defense of the state legislatures in




Legislation."" 6 The moderate nationalists (joined, of course, by states-
rightists) defeated all these proposals.
The most crucial and divisive of these efforts was the demand for
representation in the Senate based upon population. That demand
nearly brought the Convention to an end." 7 Of course, many delegates
wanted the Senate (a term drawn from Roman history) to constitute a
bastion shielding "the worthy against the licentious."" 8  But in the
Convention the central conflict over the Senate's composition centered
instead on the relationship between the population-rich (large) states
and the population-poor (small) states. That struggle was far removed
from modern concerns with one person-one vote equality; rather, the
conflict was about political power. The population-rich states deeply re-
sented the yoke of state equality imposed by the Articles of Confedera-
tion." 9 By contrast, delegates from population-poor states, particularly
those from Connecticut and Delaware, feared serious harm to their con-
tinued existence as vital, independent political communities should pop-
ulation become the standard for representation in the Senate.' 20 The
division was sharp and deep. Deadlock occurred; dissolution of the Con-
vention was a serious possibility.'
2 '
The famous "Connecticut Compromise," engineered by moderate
nationalists Sherman and Ellsworth, provided for two senators from each
state, and thus averted a convention-ending deadlock. 122 For many (but
by no means all) of its supporters, the Compromise reflected a common
perception: "We were however in a peculiar situation. We were neither the
same Nation nor different Nations. We ought not therefore to pursue the
one or the other of these ideas too closely."1 23 So stated Elbridge Gerry,
the chairman of the committee that proposed the Compromise. Earlier,
Dr. William Johnson of Connecticut had expressed that same perception
in clear and memorable terms, terms that express the uncertain implica-
116. Edmund Randolph, Virginia Resolutions (May 29, 1787), in 1 The Records of
the Federal Convention of 1787, at 20, 21 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter Farrand];
see also Anderson, supra note 44, at 44-46 (discussing the objectives of the nationalists).
117. See M.E. Bradford, Original Intentions on the Making and Ratification of the
United States Constitution 9 (1993) [hereinafter Bradford, Original Intentions].
118. Wood, supra note 103, at 475 (quotingJohn Dickinson). Thus, onJune 7, 1787,
Madison said that "the Senate ought to come from, and represent, the Wealth of the
nation." James Madison, Remarks in Debate (June 7, 1787), in I Farrand, supra note 116,
at 158, 158; see also Anderson, supra note 44, at 88-89, 94, 97-101 (discussing proposals
that wealth be the basis of representation).
119. See Anderson, supra note 44, at 45.
120. See id. at 59-62.
121. See Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States 54-60
(1913) [hereinafter Farrand, Framing]. "The smaller States would never agree to the plan
on any other principle (than an equality of suffrage in this branch ... )." Roger Sherman,
Remarks in Debate (June 11, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 116, at 192, 201.
122. See Fan-and, Framing, supra note 121, at 104-06.
123. Elbridge Gerry, Remarks in Debate (July 5, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 116,
at 524, 552 (emphasis added).
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dons of a constitution that is "neither wholly national nor wholly
federal":
The controversy must be endless whilst Gentlemen differ in the
grounds of their arguments; Those on one side considering the
States as districts of people composing one political Society;
those on the other considering them as so many political socie-
ties. The fact is that the States do exist as political Societies, and
a Govt. is to be formed for them in their political capacity, as
well as for the individuals composing them.... On the whole
he thought that as in some respects the States are to be consid-
ered in their political capacity, and in others as districts of indi-
vidual citizens, the two ideas embraced on different sides, in-
stead of being opposed to each other, ought to be combined;
that in one branch the people, ought to be represented; in the
other, the States.
124
By virtue of the Compromise, the states would continue to function as
vital and independent political communities.'2 5  And with the
Compromise in place, however wobbly at first, the Convention would go
forward to strengthen the powers of the national government. Nonethe-
less, in the new constitutional order, the Connecticut Compromise en-
sured that the states would be part of an "indestructible Union, com-
posed of indestructible States."
12 6
2. Amendment. - Resolution 13 of the Virginia Resolutions, the
platform from which the attack of the strong nationalists was made, con-
templated amendments. 127 The Convention was receptive to the general
idea. As early asjune 11, George Mason said that "[a]mendments. . . will
be necessary, and it will be better to provide for them, in an easy, regular
124. Doctor William Johnson, Remarks in Debate (June 29, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra
note 116, at 460, 461-62. Interestingly, "[i]n the two weeks of debate on the compromise,
some of it quite acrimonious, sovereignty was never mentioned." Anderson, supra note 44,
at 68.
125. See Anderson, supra note 44, at 63-67. In addition to state equality in the
Senate, a provision was added to prevent the formation of new states from the territory of
existing states without their consent. The Guarantee Clause also was understood to protect
state sovereignty and independence. See Deborah J. Merritt, Republican Governments
and Autonomous States: A New Role for the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 815,
820 (1994). The method of electing senators by the state legislatures protected similar
interests. See Anderson, supra note 44, at 126-27. In the debates, "[it became
increasingly clear that the role of the Senate as a defender of the states was the main
consideration with most delegates." Id. at 126. On the continuing importance of the states
in the new constitutional order, see, e.g., The Federalist Nos. 15, 31 (Alexander
Hamilton), Nos. 39, 40, 51 (James Madison).
126. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868). Orfield argues, however, that
some or all of the states could be extinguished through Article V and that this result does
not contravene the principle of state equality of suffrage. See Orfield, supra note 31, at
96-99.
127. See Resolution No. 13 (June 11, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 116, at 192, 202




and Constitutidnal way than to trust to chance and violence.' 28 "Easy,"
however, is a decidedly misleading term. Nothing is "easy" about the
processes prescribed by Article V. This was the constitutional design. Ar-
ticle V was a reaction to the rigid unanimity requirement of Article XIII
of the Articles of Confederation. 129 In Madison's language, Article XIII
resulted in "the absurdity of subjecting the fate of twelve States to the
perverseness or corruption of a thirteenth [i.e., Rhode Island]"; the
twelve states comprising fifty-nine sixtieths of the people.' 30 Article V was
thus a compromise between two competing policies-the Constitution
must possess a sensible mechanism for change, but the terms of the
union among the states were not to be readily altered.131 Easy, therefore,
still meant difficult.
Until the Convention moved to a close, discussion of the amend-
ment process was relatively brief.'3 2 On August 6, 1787, the Committee
of Detail reported' 33 an amending mechanism that provided that "on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the States in the Union,
the Legislature of the United States shall call a Convention for that Pur-
pose."13 4 Whether such a convention could adopt or only propose
amendments was unclear, and this apparently alarmed state-centered del-
egates. Four days later, Elbridge Gerry expressed concern that the propo-
sal would allow a simple majority of a convention to weaken the individ-
ual states. 135 The state-sensitive Roger Sherman also objected; obviously
drawing upon the Articles of Confederation, he proposed that no amend-
ments "shall be binding until consented to by the several States." i3 6 Not
surprisingly, so inflexible a standard did not succeed.'
3 7
Madison thereupon moved to eliminate the convention mechanism
altogether. He proposed instead congressional authority to propose
128. See id. at 202-03.
129. See Articles of Confederation, art. XIII (1781), in 1 Documents of American
History 111, 115 (Henry S. Commager & Milton Cantor eds., 10th ed. 1988) ("nor shall any
alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of [the Articles] unless such alteration be
agreed to in a congress of the united states, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures
of every state").
130. See The Federalist No. 40, at 251 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
see also Richard B. Bernstein &Jerome Agel, Amending America 20-30 (1993) (discussing
Madison's frustration with Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation).
131. John Calhoun later emphasized this point strongly. See infra note 148 and
accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 44, at 156.
133. See Farrand, Framing, supra note 121, at 134.
134. Committee of Detail VIII (proceedings of the Convention, June 19-July 23,
1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 116, at 129, 159.
135. See Elbridge Gerry, Remarks in Debate (Sept. 10, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra
note 116, at 557, 557-59. By contrast, Hamilton insisted that Congress was more likely
than the states to perceive failure in constitutional design. See Vile, The Amending
Process, supra note 31, at 29.
136. Roger Sherman, Remarks in Debate (Sept. 10, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note
116, at 557, 558.
137. See Debate of Sept. 10, 1787, in 2 Farrand, supra note 116, at 557, 558-59.
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amendments by a two-thirds vote or after having received petitions from
two-thirds of the states.13 8 The end result of that day's debate was the
three-fourths rule, a measure proposed by Wilson.
13 9
On September 15, only two days before the Convention's end, the
present form of Article V was settled. The discussion is illuminating.
Sherman again expressed the state-centered fears that underlay the
Connecticut Compromise:
Mr. Sherman expressed his fears that three fourths of the
States might be brought to do things fatal to particular States, as
abolishing them altogether or depriving them of their equality in the Sen-
ate. He thought it reasonable that the proviso in favor of the
States importing slaves should be extended so as to provide that
no State should be affected in its internal police, or deprived of its equal-
ity in the Senate.
Col: Mason thought the plan of amending the Constitution
exceptionable & dangerous... [because, given the role of Con-
gress] no amendments of the proper kind would ever be ob-
tained by the people, if the Government should become oppres-
sive, as he verily believed would be the case.
140
In response to Mason's concerns, Gouverneur Morris and Elbridge Gerry
moved to amend the article so as to require a convention on the applica-
tion of two-thirds of the states; that measure passed without contest.
141
Sherman once again rose to protect states' rights. After his initial
motion concerning future constitutional conventions failed, Sherman
moved to "annex to the end of the article a further proviso 'that no State
shall without its consent be affected in its internal police, or deprived of
its equal suffrage in the Senate.' "142 Madison objected by replying
"[blegin with these special provisos, and every State will insist on them,
for their boundaries, exports &c."' 14 3 Sherman's motion failed (3-8), as
did his subsequent motion to strike out Article V altogether (2-8).'4
138. See James Madison, Remarks in Debate (Sept. 10, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra
note 116, at 557, 559.
139. SeeJames Wilson, Remarks in Debate (Sept. 10, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note
116, at 557, 559.
140. Roger Sherman & George Mason, Remarks in Debate (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2
Farrand, supra note 116, at 621, 629 (emphasis added).
141. See Debate of Sept. 15, 1787, in 2 Farrand, supra note 116, at 621, 629-30.
142. Roger Sherman, Remarks in Debate (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note
116, at 621, 630.
143. James Madison, Remarks in Debate (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note
116, at 621, 630.
144. See Debate of Sept. 15, 1787, in 2 Fan-and, supra note 116, at 621, 630-31.
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Although the great majority of the delegates had not been willing to
grant sweeping immunity to the states against amendment, there was, if
not unanimous support for, at least no opposition to, a more limited mea-
sure designed to ensure that the states would retain their political inde-
pendence for perpetuity:
Mr. Govr Morris moved to annex a further proviso-"that
no State, without its consent shall be deprived of its equal suf-
frage in the Senate"
This motion being dictated by the circulating murmurs of the small
States was agreed to without debate, no one opposing it, or on the ques-
tion, saying no.145
During the entire debate, no hint appeared that Article V was not
viewed as the exclusive mode of amendment. It strains credulity even to
suggest that a widely shared premise of the debates was that "We the Peo-
ple" (let alone "We the Majority") could amend outside its framework.
Moreover, here at the very end of the Convention, Gouverneur Morris, a
strong nationalist, moved to entrench state equality in the Senate. The
Entrenchment Clause was designed to protect the results of the
Connecticut Compromise: 46
This focus on the states makes it clear that the defeat of the
nationalists on the Connecticut compromise was not confined
to the Senate or to the structure of the government. Here at the
end of the Convention their opponents were relentlessly build-
ing the equality of states into the foundations of the system
whence it could reassert itself on all future amendments. The
idea of a single national body politic whose peaple were the source of
supreme power, and therefore of the supreme law, was not even a debat-
able position.147
3. The Mode of Ratification. - The Convention agreed upon the
mode of ratification even before it had settled upon the amendment pro-
cess.' 48 Here, too, the "idea of a single national body politic [that was]
145. Id. at 631 (emphasis added).
146. In "Philadelphia Revisited," Amar notes that the Entrenchment Clause was "no
part of the famous 'Connecticut Compromise,'" wrongly implying that it had no
connection therewith. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 2, at 1070 n.97.
147. Anderson, supra note 44, at 160 (emphasis added) (foomote omitted); see also
Orfield, supra note 31, at 4 ("Instead of permitting amendment by a single convention, the
plan made necessary the participation of the legislatures or conventions of the states.");
Tribe, supra note 32, at 1241 ("Article V... address[es] how the most fundamental
agreements-among the people and their government, . . . may be altered or made.
[Article V is] among the provisions that establish the basic framework .... [Article V]
give [s] to the states a decisive role in ratifying fundamental national commitments.... ").
148. The ratification procedure was approved on August 31, 1787. SeeJournal (Aug.
31, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 116, at 471, 472. Furthermore, the general contours of
Article VII had been agreed upon even earlier, on July 28, 1787. See James Madison,
Remarks in Debate (July 23, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 116, at 87, 93. Interestingly,
Calhoun thought that the constitutional amendment and ratification procedures were
substantially identical. See John C. Calhoun, A Discourse on the Constitution and
Government of the United States, in A Disquisition on Government and a Discourse on the
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... the source of supreme power" is nowhere to be found. Anderson
asks:
Why were no voices raised, like Wilson's before the Connecticut
compromise, eloquently arguing for the people, not the states,
as the foundation of the system? If the prevailing conception
had been of one sovereign "people of the United States," as
Marshall was later to say, one might expect debate to center on
appropriate methods for distinguishing the people's legislative
will from their constitutional will. But no such debate took
place. Instead, attention centered on the dangers to the sepa-
rate states and the conditions under which they would agree to
be bound by the other states. In this manner the matter of pop-
ular sovereignty, whether to implement it or to restrain it, at the
national or at the state level, was simply passed over in
silence. 149
Thus, both the processes of amendment and ratification were designed to
reflect a constitutional order that was "neither wholly national nor wholly
federal."
B. State Ratification Debates
1. The Dangers of "History Lite. - I have long been sensitive to the
dangers of "History 'Lite'" when law professors write legal "history."150
Constitution and Government of the United States 111, 158 (Richard K. Cralle ed., 1968)
[hereinafter Calhoun, Discourse] ("nothing is more evident than that the amending power
is ... but a modification of the original creating power, by which the constitution was
ordained and established"). But see Anderson, supra note 44, at 163 (existence of Articles
of Confederation and fears of state legislatures made ratification procedure substantively
different from Article V processes).
149. Anderson, supra note 44, at 159. Supported by Wilson, Madison was the
strongest advocate for a popular role in approving the Constitution, suggesting that
ratification should "require the concurrence of a majority of both the States and the
people." James Madison, Remarks in Debate (Aug. 31, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note
116, at 475, 475 (emphasis added). Madison and Wilson wanted ratification in "the most
unexceptionable form, and by the supreme authority of the people themselves." James
Madison, Remarks in Debate (June 5, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 116, at 119, 123; see
also James Wilson, Remarks in Debate (June 5, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 116, at 126,
127 ("the people ... are the only power that can ratify the proposed system of the new
government"). In response to an objection that the Maryland constitution did not permit
the proposed ratification procedure, Madison replied,
The difficulty in Maryland was no greater than in other States, where no mode of
change was pointed out by the Constitution, and all officers were under oath to
support it. The people were in fact, the fountain of all power, and by resorting to
them, all difficulties were got over. They could alter constitutions as they pleased.
James Madison, Remarks in Debate (Aug. 31, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note 116, at 475,
476. According to Anderson, however, these references to the "people" "did not denote a
single national people as distinguished from the peoples of the separate states, nor did
[they] imply any democratic conception of the ongoing political process. The people were
used abstractly, much as Locke had used them." Anderson, supra note 44, at 166.
150. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern Constitutionalism, 95
Colum. L. Rev. 523, 524 (1995).
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Writing about the relatively bounded doings of the Constitutional
Convention is one thing. Writing about the state debates over the ratifi-
cation of the federal Constitution is an undertaking of quite a different
magnitude. Moreover, even professionally trained historians (of which I
am not one) lack a complete set of materials on the ratification
debates. 151
Examining the available writings to the extent that I (and my semi-
nar class) could, I can find no evidence-none at all-for the proposi-
tion that Article V was understood not to be the exclusive method of
amendment because of an overriding and widely shared conception of
national popular sovereignty. Like the Constitutional Convention, the
central focus of the ratification debates concerned the role of the states
in the new constitutional order. Article V was proffered as an assurance
of the protection afforded by the new Constitution to the peoples of the
several states.
2. The Debates. - Given the national pride in our Constitution, the
struggle over ratification is now generally forgotten. Even though it had
the endorsement of George Washington-universally revered (in my
judgment, correctly so) and universally expected to lead the new govern-
ment-the proposed Constitution faced serious ratification obstacles. In
four states, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and New
York, the ratifying conventions contained a significant majority of Anti-
151. Historically, primary reliance has been placed upon the relatively limited range
of Elliot's report of the ratification debates in the state conventions. See The Debates in
the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Jonathon
Elliot ed., 1881) [hereinafter Elliot's Debates]. Ten volumes of a comprehensive 23
volume set, entitled The Documentaiy History of the Ratification of the Constitution, have now
appeared, which include relevant materials from outside the state convention debates. See
Documentary History, supra note 97 (Volume I contains some introductory documents;
Volumes II to XVI concern the ratification debates in the states; Volumes XVI to XXI will
deal with publications of general interest; and Volumes XXII and XXIII are to be on the
ratification of the Bill of Rights). The volumes are being published out of numerical
sequence. Of central importance here is the fact that one volume on Pennsylvania and
three volumes on Virginia are in existence, but the important volumes on ratification in
Massachusetts, North Carolina, and New York are still in progress so that other, less
complete, sources still must be used. I mention these difficulties because they have a
bearing on anyone's work in this area.
The other available materials are selective. Bernard Bailyn's The Debate on the
Constitution provides a splendid two volume sampling of the writings on the state
ratification debates. See Bernard Bailyn, The Debate on the Constitution (1993). For
background, Philip Kurland and Ralph Lerner's five volume The Founders' Constitution
collects contemporaneous commentary on the general themes underlying the
Constitution, as well as upon each clause of the Constitution. See The Founders'
Constitution (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). Two comprehensive volumes,
each with extensive bibliographies, also deal with the ratification process on a state-by-state
basis. See The Constitution and the States: The Role of the Original Thirteen in the
Framing and Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Patrick T. Conley &John P. Kaminski
eds., 1988) [hereinafter The Constitution and The States]; Ratifying the Constitution
(Michael A. Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds., 1989). For a brief account, see Craig R.
Smith, To Form a More Perfect Union (1993).
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Federalist sentiment.' 52 A fifth state, Rhode Island, did not even bother
to call a convention; the Constitution was submitted directly to-and re-
jected by-an electorate known to be overwhelmingly hostile. 15 3 Had the
ratification proceedings moved along a different sequence, our Constitu-
tion might not have been ratified. 154 (Outright rejection, it should be
recalled, was not the only form of opposition. There were numerous calls
for a second convention.)1
5 5
The Constitution's opponents most feared "consolidated" national
government. 156 For these critics, "the states [were] primary, . . . they
[were] equal, and . . . they possessed the main weight of political
power."'1 57 As Professor Raoul Berger has said, the colonists were
"[c] onvinced that the distant British government had oppressed them...
[and] were little minded to put their trust in a remote federal
government."' 5 8
Responding quickly to Anti-Federalist sentiment, the Federalists de-
flected the state-centered attack by, in effect, embracing it.' 5 9 Generally,
they acknowledged the political and legal priority of the states:
160
[The] characteristic Federalist position was to deny that the
choice lay between confederation and consolidation and to con-
tend that in fact the Constitution provided a new form, partly
national and partly federal. This was Publius' argument in The
Federalist, no. 39. It was Madison's argument in the Virginia rati-
fying convention. And it was the usual argument of James
Wilson himself, who emphasized the strictly limited powers _of
152. See, e.g., Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 33, at 526-27.
153. See id. at 527. In the end, "We the People" of Rhode Island were coerced into
joining the Union. See id. at 538-39 (an engaging account of steps taken by Congress to
force Rhode Island's ratification).
154. See, e.g., Bradford, Original Intentions, supra note 117, at 39-40 ("bandwagon
psychology" was key to ratification). As it was, the Federalists' margin of victory was close:
ten votes in Virginia (89-79) and New Hampshire (78-68), and only three in New York (30-
27). See Bernstein & Agel, supra note 130, at 30.
155. See Scott Lybarger, The Call for a Second Convention, in Smith, supra note 151,
at 17, 18.
156. See, e.g., HerbertJ. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For 10-11, 15-23
(1981). Robert Rutland states that the Federalists had "undoubtedly underestimated the
attachment of citizens to their states." Robert A. Rutland, The Ordeal of the Constitution:
The Antifederalists and the Ratification Struggle of 1787-1788, at 31 (1983).
157. Storing, supra note 156, at 9.
158. Berger, supra note 66, at 56.
159. See, e.g., Storing, supra note 156, at 11 ("most of the Federalists agreed or
professed to agree that consolidation was undesirable"). Had the people believed that
states would be reduced to administrative districts, the Constitution would not have been
ratified. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 296 (1936).
160. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 66, at 68-71 (quoting Sherman saying "[t]he powers
vested in the federal government are clearly defined, so that each state will retain its
sovereignty in what concerns its own internal government"); Rutland, supra note 156, at 26
(paraphrasing Wilson as having said that "[w] hat the framers left unmentioned was done
intentionally, to leave unmolested wide areas within the jurisdiction of the state
governments where they belonged"); Storing, supra note 156, at 12.
1996]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
the general government and the essential part to be played in it
by the states.
161
Storing elsewhere observes that "it is striking how widely the Federalists
adopted the view of the Union as a coming together of sovereign
states." 162 The "nationalists who met at Philadelphia became federalists as
they sought to translate their vision of national power and prosperity into
a politically acceptable constitutional design.'
163
In The Federalist, both Madison and Hamilton vigorously espoused
the views of the Convention's moderate nationalists (after all, this Consti-
tution was considerably better than the Articles of Confederation). Feder-
alist No. 39 was, of course, Madison's powerful statement of the continued
importance of the states in the new constitutional order.'l e In Federalist
No. 46, Madison emphasized the significant protections that the states
would possess in the new constitutional order against an overreaching
national government. 165 Hamilton expressed similar views. In Federalist
No. 32, Hamilton categorically denied that the new constitutional order
would result in "consolidation": "[A]s the plan of the Convention aims
only at a partial union or consolidation, the State governments would
clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and
which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States.' 6
6
Hamilton's discussion of the amendment process in Federalist No. 85 said
that the states would be protected by Article V's supermajority require-
ments against "the encroachments of the national authority."'167
At the same time, in the ratification debates, Federalists also freely
invoked the rhetoric of popular sovereignty, particularly when respond-
ing to charges that the method of ratification of the proposed constitu-
tion was "illegal."1 68 In "Philadelphia Revisited," Amar argues that the
161. Storing, supra note 156, at 12.
162. HerbertJ. Storing, The "Other" Federalist Papers: A Preliminary Sketch, 6 Pol.
Sci. Rev. 215, 222 (1976).
163. Cathy D. Matson & Peter S. Onuf, A Union of Interests 101 (1990).
164. See The Federalist No. 39 (James Madison). Given all the evidence discussed in
the text, Amar's efforts to paint this essay as "idiosyncratic" pass my understanding. See,
e.g., Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 2, at 507; Amar, Philadelphia Revisited,
supra note 2, at 1063-64.
165. See The Federalist No. 46, at 297-99 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (any "unwarrantable measure of the federal government," if "unpopular in
particular States," would be met with opposition both "powerful and at hand"). Indeed, in
Federalist No. 51, Madison went so far as to extol his former nemesis, the state legislatures,
which he now portrayed as checking the excesses of the national government. See The
Federalist No. 51, at 323-24 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (the state and
federal governments "will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled
by itself").
166. The Federalist No. 32, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
167. The Federalist No. 85, at 26 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
168. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 22, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (offering, as a critique of the Articles of Confederation, the fact that it "never
had a ratification by the PEOPLE"); The Federalist No. 40, at 253 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that the convention "must have borne in mind that as
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principle of majority rule convinced the people that adoption of the new
Constitution in a manner other than that prescribed by the Articles of
Confederation or, more importantly, by their own state constitutions, was
nonetheless legal. 169 I believe that Amar here conflates questions of le-
gality and legitimacy.' 70 The ratification debates reflected a widespread
belief that, whether "illegal" or not, ratification of the new Constitution
would establish a legitimate national governmental order,17 1 and thereby
establish a new basis for measuring legality.
3. State by State. - On a state by state basis, there is a wide discrep-
ancy in the amount of available material on the ratification. For exam-
ple, in three states (Delaware, New Jersey, and Georgia) almost no
records of the ratifying convention debates exist;172 in three others
(Maryland, New Hampshire, and Connecticut), the records are quite
incomplete.
73
We proceed as best we can. Delaware ratified quickly and unani-
mously.174 Pennsylvania, the first large state to ratify, was the scene of the
first significant debate; 75 James Wilson was clearly the dominant figure
in those proceedings. 176 Despite Amar's heavy reliance on Wilson for a
the plan to be framed and proposed was to be submitted to the people themselves, the
disapprobation of this supreme authority would destroy it forever . . ."); see also The
Federalist No. 43, at 279-80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (claiming that
the convention could supersede the Articles of Confederation because "in many States [the
Articles] had received no higher sanction than a mere legislative ratification").
169. See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 2, at 1050, 1054. On the latter
point, see Ackerman and Katyal, supra note 33, at 484-87 (distinguishing two types of state
constitutions: "those that contemplated the use of conventions in the process of state
revision, and those that did not").
170. See Richard S. Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 Const. Commentary 57,
60 (1987) (discussing this distinction); see also Ackerman and Katyal, supra note 33, at
539-59 (arguing that the Federalists were not legalists, but revolutionaries). David Dow, by
contrast, argues that the question of the Constitution's "legality" is an empty one. See
Dow, supra note 38, at 21. Frederick Schauer describes the debate as "curious." See
Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in Responding to
Imperfection, supra note 31, at 141, 154 n.20.
171. See Storing, supra note 156, at 13-14; see also Tribe, supra note 32, at 1289-92
(arguing that the legality or illegality of the Constitution does determine its legitimacy).
172. See 9 Documentary History, supra note 97, at 7. The proceedings of the
Delaware convention have been lost, see id. at 105; those of the New Jersey convention
consist primarily of minutes, see id. at 177-91; and those of the Georgia convention
"consist of little more than the bare proceedings for each day and a list of the delegates
.. " Id. at 269.
173. Only four speeches survive from the Connecticut ratification debate, we have
one from the debate in New Hampshire, and the only record from Maryland is a summary
report. See 2 Elliot's Debates, supra note 151, at 185-204, 547-56. As noted above, Rhode
Island did not even call a ratifying convention. See supra text accompanying note 153.
174. See Bernstein & Agel, supra note 130, at 23.
175. See Paul J. Scudiere, In Order to Form a More Perfect Union: The United
States, 1774-1791, in The Constitution and the States, supra note 151, at 3, 15.
176. See Paul Doutrich, From Revolution to Constitution: Pennsylvania's Path to
Federalism, 1774-1791, in The Constitution and the States, supra note 151, at 37, 45.
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"We the Majority" principle,1 77 Wilson provides him with, at best, weak
support. Wilson's famous State House Yard Speech of October 6th, given
before the state ratification proceedings began, received extensive na-
tional circulation as the classic exposition of the Federalist position.'
78
Wilson's only reference to Article V in that speech misquoted it, but quite
plainly suggests that it was the exclusive mode for amending the national
Constitution. 179 It is true that during the ratifying convention, Wilson
referred to the supreme power of the people-"a power paramount to
every constitution.' 80 He seems to have endorsed the concept of a pre-
existing national "We the People" who had brought the Constitution into
being,' 8 ' and on several occasions he expressed the view that the people
have the power to alter, amend, or abolish the Constitution at whatever
time and in whatever manner they wish.' 82 On these occasions he did
not mention Article V, allowing his reader or audience to infer that Arti-
cle V sufficiently embodies this power of the people so far as a federal
system is concerned.'85 Indeed, at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention,
177. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
178. See Smith, supra note 151, at 37.
179. SeeJames Wilson's Speech in the State House Yard, Philadelphia (Oct. 6, 1787),
in 2 Documentary History, supra note 97, at 167, 172 ("If there are errors... the seeds of
reformation are sown in the work itself, and the concurrence of two-thirds of the Congress
may at any time introduce alterations and amendments.").
180. Version of Wilson's Speech by Alexander J. Dallas (Nov. 24, 1787), in 2
Documentary History, supra note 97, at 340, 349.
181. SeeJames Wilson, Remarks at the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 11, 1787), in 2
Documentary History, supra note 97, at 550, 555 ("This.. . is not a government founded
upon compact; it is founded upon the power of the people."); James Wilson, Remarks at
the Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2 Documentary History, supra note 97, at
382, 3883 ("Those who ordain and establish have the power, if they think proper, to repeal
and annul."); Version of Wilson's Speech by Thomas Lloyd (Nov. 24, 1787), in 2
Documentary History, supra note 97, at 350, 362 ("[T]he people may change the
constitutions whenever and however they please."); see also Moore, supra note 98, at
348-52 (contrasting differences and similarities between Madison and Wilson).
182. See, e.g., James Wilson, Of the Study of the Law in the United States, in 1 The
Works of James Wilson 69, 77 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967) (the people "retain the
right of abolishing, altering, or amending their constitution, at whatever time, and in
whatever manner, they shall deem it expedient"). The force of "whatever time"/"whatever
manner" in this passage, it should be noted, comes from its contrast to Wilson's statement
of Blackstone's view, according to which this right of the people is a "political chimera,"
and thus revolutionary constitutional change is only legitimate when there is a special
"conjunction of circumstances." Id. at 77-78. In this respect, constitutional change
through Article V would satisfy the principle Wilson describes here, since such change can
legitimately occur even without Blackstone's conjunction of circumstances.
183. It is true, however, that Wilson himself may have understood his statements to
imply more than what his audience understood. His biographer, Geoffrey Seed, notes that
"[o]n more than one ... occasion Wilson created the suspicion that there was more
behind a proposal he was advancing than appeared on the surface. He had a very astute
mind, and was aloof and perhaps even secretive by nature .... " Seed, supra note 88, at 28.
For a negative assessment of Wilson's character, see Bradford, Founding Fathers, supra
note 110, at 87-88 (describing Wilson as a "philosopher of democracy who attacked slavery
and then bought slaves ... unable to act the part of kinsman to members of his own family
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Thomas McKean, the future chief justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, understood Wilson to mean that the power of the people was satis-
fied by Article V.18 4 After the Constitution was adopted, Wilson referred
on one occasion to a right of the people to effect constitutional change
by simple majority vote, but he did not comment on the relation of this
right to Article V or make any direct mention of Article V at all. 18 5 When
he does mention Article V, he never adds that the people can also always
amend by simple majority vote.'8 6 Moreover, throughout the state con-
vention debates, Wilson was at pains to rebut claims that the new
Constitution would denigrate the states.'
8 7
After Pennsylvania's ratification, three small states, NewJersey, Geor-
gia, and Connecticut, ratified in quick succession; in New Jersey and
Georgia, the approval was unanimous.1 88 In New Hampshire, outnum-
bered Federalists successfully postponed their convention, hoping to ben-
efit if matters went well in Massachusetts.' 8 9 There, in another conven-
tion numerically dominated by Anti-Federalists, a hard contest took
place. 90 Fears of "consolidation" and destruction of state independence
left behind in his native Scotland or to pay his debts to the relatives and friends who
launched him on his American career ... [and never) so interested in the will of the
people as in the sponsorship of the 'better sort' in the hopes of making money").
184. In the convention, on November 28, Thomas McKean said: "If, sir, the people
should at any time desire to alter and abolish their government, I agree with my honorable
colleague [James Wilson] that it is in their power to do so, and I am happy to observe that
the Constitution before us provides a regular mode for that event." Thomas McKean,
Remarks at the Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2 Documentary History, supra
note 97, at 382, 387. Note that McKean implies that the Article V power is a power of the
people. This undercuts Amar's claim that contemporary understanding distinguished
sharply between the people's right to change the Constitution and government-controlled
change via Article V. See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 2, at 459-60.
185. See James Wilson, Of Government, in 1 The Works ofJames Wilson, supra note
182, at 284, 304 ("[a] majority of the society is sufficient" to change the Constitution).
Wilson goes on to say, however, that if the majority infringes "the act of original
association," or violates "the intention of those who united under it," then the minority is
'not obliged to submit to the new government." Id.
186. In the Pennsylvania ratification debates, Wilson stated that the state constitution
"cannot be amended by any other mode than that which it directs." 2 Elliot's Debates,
supra note 151, at 457 (statement ofJames Wilson).
187. Indeed, even in the Constitutional Convention, Wilson stated: "I dont [sic]
agree that the Genl. Govt. will swallow up the states .... I think they must be preserved
they must be continued.., our Country is too extensive for a single Govt." James Wilson,
Remarks in Debate (June 19, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 116, at 329, 330.
188. See Scudiere, supra note 175, at 15-16.
189. See Jere Daniell, New Hampshire: Ideology and Hardball, in The Constitution
and the States, supra note 151, at 181, 181-82.
190. The Documentary History volume for Massachusetts is not yet in print. The
usual reference is to Volume 2 of Elliot's Debates, supra note 151. More comprehensive,
however, is an 1856 volume, which includes Elliot's Debates, Judge Parson's Minutes, and
various songs, letters, and editorials that reflect popular feeling. See Massachusetts
Constitutional Convention of 1788, Debates & Proceedings (Branford K. Pierce & Charles
Hale eds., 1856). Finally, mention should be made of Samuel B. Harding, The Contest
over the Ratification of the Federal Constitution in the State of Massachusetts (Da Capo
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were voiced repeatedly. "[N]o argument... has made a deeper impres-
sion than this, that [the Constitution] will produce a consolidation of the
states," stated Fisher Ames. 191 The Federalists denied these charges.'
9 2
Ames, for example, responded that "[t]he state governments are essential
parts of the system .... [T]he senators represent the sovereignty of the
states.' 93 Massachusetts Federalists finally persuaded the influential but
vacillating Anti-Federalist Governor Hancock to support ratification.1
9 4
To deflect calls for a second convention, Federalists agreed to accompany
ratification with a list of suggested amendments, 195 and "enjoin [ed] their
representatives" to press for their consideration "agreeably to the 5th arti-
cle of said Constitution." 196 That pattern took hold. After Massachusetts,
every ratifying state submitted a list of proposed amendments, each of
which, incidentally, included some form of what is now the Tenth
Amendment. 9
7
In Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, and Virginia, the
Constitution was, at least nominally, considered clause by clause. When
we examine those debates, we do not find the slightest suggestion that
state equality in the Senate could be obliterated by "We the People," let
alone by "We the Majority.' 198 In North Carolina, for example, James
Press 1970) (1896), which begins with the debates in the town meetings organized to select
delegates. Harding is clearly hostile to the interests of the "lower" classes who opposed
ratification. See, e.g., id. at 7 ("A more pernicious result of [popular suffrage] was the
development and confirmation of the belief, among the masses, that in the framing of a
constitution no higher order of intellect is necessary than in the laying out of a country
road ....").
191. 2 Elliot's Debates, supra note 151, at 45 (statement of Fisher Ames).
192. See, e.g., id. at 37-38 (statement ofJudge Dana) ("[T]his was a charge brought
against [the constitution] without any foundation in truth.").
193. Id. at 46 (statement of Fisher Ames).
194. Popular but indecisive Hancock was, at least in part, induced to act by
suggestions that he might become Vice President, indeed maybe even President, if
Washington did not run. See Bradford, Original Intentions, supra note 117, at 51.
195. Id.
196. 2 Elliot's Debates, supra note 151, at 178.
197. See Smith, supra note 151, at 128. "[T]he reservation made explicit by the
Tenth Amendment, as Willard Hurst observed, 'represented a political bargain, key terms
of which assumed the continuing vitality of the states as prime law makers in most affairs.'"
Berger, supra note 66, at 87 (quoting Willard Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business
Corporation in the Law of the United States 40 (1970)). The expansive conception of the
implied powers of the national government in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819), is completely irreconcilable with the terms of these proposals. Perhaps
McCulloch's conception reflects the views of the Federalist-dominated first Congress. See
generally Creating the Bill of Rights (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) (documentary record
of the first Congress, including extensive materials on the Tenth Amendment).
198. See, e.g., Federal Farmer, Letters to the Republican, Letter IV (Oct. 28, 1787), in
14 Documentary History, supra note 97, at 42, 47-48 (decrying difficulty of amendments
because "no measures can be taken ... unless two-thirds of the several states shall agree");
Letter from William Grayson to William Short (Nov. 10, 1787), in 14 Documentary History,
supra note 97, at 81, 82 (noting that "the little States should be armed with a repulsive
quality to preserve their own existence").
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Iredell, a future Justice of the Supreme Court, clearly assumed that Arti-
cle V was the only mode of amendment, and he added that "[i]n order
that no consolidation should take place, it is provided that no state shall,
by any amendment or alteration, be ever deprived of an equal suffrage in
the senate without its own consent "199
More specifically, in the discussions of Article V, no suggestion ex-
ists-except perhaps one oblique comment in Virginia by Edmund
Pendleton-that Article V could be avoided.200 This is true both of those
who praised the Article and those who criticized it. In Massachusetts,
"[a]fter the 5th article was read at the table":
Mr. KING observed, that he believed gentlemen had not, in
their objections to the Constitution, recollected that this article
was a part of it; for many of the arguments of gentlemen were
founded on the idea of future amendments being impractica-
ble. The honorable gentleman observed on the superior excel-
lence of the proposed Constitution in this particular, and called
upon gentlemen to produce an instance, in any other national
constitution, where the people had so fair an opportunity to cor-
rect any abuse which might take place in the future administra-
tion of the government under it.
Dr. JARVIS. Mr. President, I cannot suffer the present arti-
cle to be passed, without rising to express my entire and perfect
approbation of itY
°1
At the close of the Massachusetts convention, a delegate remarked that
the proposed constitution "is not, like the laws of the Medes and Persians,
immutable. The fifth article provides for amendments."
20 2
199. 4 Elliot's Debates, supra note 151, at 177 (statement ofJames Iredell).
200. Pendleton was not a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, but he was
president of the Virginia ratifying convention. In the course of a speech responding to the
fear that necessary amendments might not be introduced, he asked:
What then? We will resist, did my friend say? conveying an idea of force. Who
shall dare to resist the people? No, we will assemble in Convention; wholly recall
our delegated powers, or reform them so as to prevent such abuse; and punish
those servants who have perverted powers, designed for our happiness, to their
own emolument.
3 Elliot's Debates, supra note 151, at 37 (statement of Edmund Pendleton); see also Vile,
Legally Amending, supra note 38, at 286 ("[W]hatever point Pendleton was making, it is
unlikely that he was ... suggesting that a mere majority of the people would be able to
alter the Constitution"). At most, Pendleton seems to have assumed that there would be
another convention and another ratification process. This is a far cry from national
popular sovereignty, and a still farther cry from "We the Majority." To my eye, moreover,
Pendleton is talking about the right of Virginia to secede through the very process (i.e., a
convention) by which it joined the union.
201. 2 Elliot's Debates, supra note 151, at 116 (statements of Rufus King and Charles
Jarvis); see also id. at 83-84 (statement ofJames Bowdoin) (arguing that the Constitution,
if imperfect, can be amended in one of the modes prescribed); id. at 124-25 (statement of
Samuel Adams) (favoring amendments and commenting on the difficulty of achieving
them under Article V).
202. 2 Elliot's Debates, supra note 151, at 169 (remarks of Samuel Stillman).
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Additionally, while many opponents deplored the practical impossi-
bility of amendments, no voice was heard suggesting the availability of
amendment by "We the Majority." For example, in a lengthy discussion
in the Virginia convention, Patrick Henry decried the fact that a "bare
majority" in "four small States" containing "one-twentieth part of the
American people" might "prevent the removal of the most grievous in-
conveniences and oppression, by refusing to accede to amendments."20
3
Henry unfavorably compared Article V with the Virginia provision for
amendment by a majority of the people:
This, Sir, is the language of democracy; that a majority of the
community have a right to alter their Government when found
to be oppressive: But how different is the genius of your new
Constitution from this? How different from the sentiments of
freemen, that a contemptible minority can prevent the good of
the majority? If then Gentlemen standing on this ground, are
come to that point, that they are willing to bind themselves and
their posterity to be oppressed, I am amazed and inexpressibly
astonished. 2
04
Henry acknowledged that a majority could not alter the national Consti-
tution,205 and Madison so understood him.
20 6
In North Carolina, a similar understanding pervaded the discussion.
During the convention, William Davie, a Federalist, stated:
It must be granted that there is no way of obtaining amend-
ments but the mode prescribed in the Constitution; two thirds
of the legislatures of the states in the confederacy may require Con-
gress to call a convention to propose amendments, or the same
proportion of both houses may propose them....
A majority is the rule of republican decisions. It was the
voice of a majority of the people of America that gave that sys-
tem [the Articles of Confederation] validity, and the same au-
thority can and will annul it at any time. Every man of common
sense knows that the political power is political right.
20 7
203. Patrick Henry, Remarks at the Virginia Convention (June 5, 1788), in 9
Documentary History, supra note 97, at 943, 956.
204. Id.; see also Patrick Henry, Remarks at the Virginia Convention (June 24, 1788),
in 10 Documentary History, supra note 97, at 1473, 1480-81 (critiquing unanimity
provisions); cf. James Madison, Remarks at the Virginia Convention (June 6, 1788), in 9
Documentary History, supra note 97, at 970, 991 (critiquing Article XIII of the Articles of
Confederation as, inter alia, "perniciously improvident and injudicious" in its requirement
of unanimity).
205. See Patrick Henry, Remarks at the Virginia Convention (June 24, 1788), in 10
Documentary History, supra note 97, at 1473, 1480-81; Patrick Henry, Remarks at the
Virginia Convention (June 5, 1788), in 9 Documentary History, supra note 97, at 943,
955-60.
206. See James Madison, Remarks at the Virginia Convention (June 6, 1788), in 9
Documentary History, supra note 97, at 970, 991 ("He [Henry] complains of this
Constitution, because it requires the consent of at least three-fourths of the States to
introduce amendments .... ").
207. 4 Elliot's Debates, supra note 151, at 236-38 (statement of William Davie).
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C. Amar, History, and Federalism
Amar cannot escape this history by pointing to 'We the People" or
"We the Majority" rhetoric used in contexts other than Article V (such as
amendments to state constitutions),208 by reliance upon the Blackstonian
concept of the impossibility of an imperium in imperio,20 9 or by reliance on
the inalienability of sovereignty.210 On the most elementary level, Amar's
"First Theorem" ignores the fact that each citizen holds, in various
strengths, ideas that are clearly in tension with one another; indeed,
pushed hard, these ideas may be logically contradictory.21' (Many prac-
ticing Catholics, to give an obvious contemporary example, believe con-
traception and even abortion to be proper.) This condition certainly ex-
isted in the intellectually charged founding era. Ideas such as the
desirability of popular sovereignty and the wish for a government
"neither wholly national nor wholly federa"21 2 pulled in different direc-
tions. Moreover, the important concepts (e.g., republicanism, states'
rights, and so on) were "contested,"213 largely because they were em-
ployed as instruments of battle in a struggle over the shape of the emerg-
ing polity. Professor Kramnick has observed,
208. See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 2, at 1050-51.
209. See id. at 1063; Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 48, at 1430-35, 1442. It is true
that Blackstone's work was well known in America. See William D. Bader, Some Thoughts
on Blackstone, Precedent, and Originalism, 19 Vt. L. Rev. 5, 6 (1994). Blackstone's
influence is sharply criticized in H. Jefferson Powell, The Moral Tradition of American
Constitutionalism: A Theological Interpretation 82-86 (1993). Powell points out that
"American lawyers tempered their appreciation of Blackstone's pedagogical value with an
active recognition and rejection of his politics." Id. at 82. Amar ignores the founding era
departures from Blackstone's concept of sovereignty. On the Founders' rejection of
Blackstone's notion that sovereignty is vested in the legislature, see Wood, supra note 103,
at 530.
210. See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 2, at 1072-74. Amar's argument on
inalienability seems to be based on political theory, and not on the common
understanding in 1789. If Amar uses inalienability to mean majority rule, then the
Constitution's numerous provisions requiring supermajorities would seem to undermine
the notion that sovereignty is inalienable. See Dow, supra note 38, at 52-53. More
importantly, as noted above, Amar never explains how the people of Delaware, or any
other state, alienated their prior right to independence from the union once they ratified
the Constitution. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
211. David Dow effectively criticizes Amar along these lines. See Dow, supra note 38,
at 6-10, 26-29, particularly at 26 n.127 (analyzing, and rejecting explicitly, Amar's
inalienability analysis).
212. The Federalist No. 39, at 246 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
213. "[D]uring the eighteenth century," these terms were "in a state of flux."
McDonald, supra note 48, at 4. For example, the meaning of "republicanism" was
contested during the founding era and that meaning has continued to shift until the
present day, as can be seen in current academic writings stressing civic republicanism. See
Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79J. Am. Hist. 11 (1992);
Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev.
131, 135 (1995). Additionally, Bradford's Original Intentions argues that the differences
among the regions and individual states should cause us to recognize the idea of multiple
original intentions and original understandings. See Bradford, supra note 117, at xvi.
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Federalists and Antifederalists, in fact, tapped several languages
of politics .... None dominated the field, and the use of one
was compatible with the use of another by the same writer or
speaker.... There was a profusion and confusion of political
tongues among the founders. They lived easily with that clatter;
it is we, two hundred and more years later, who chafe at their
inconsistency.
214
For me, however, Amar's central mistake runs much deeper than a
failure to recognize the intellectual turbulence of 1789. Amar does not
address the structural role of Article V in reinforcing the defining charac-
,teristic of the 1789 constitutional order-namely, federalism. His claim
thus directly contradicts what can be said with confidence about the
founding era. The Framers "preserved the states as separate sources of
authority and organs of administration-a point on which they hardly
had a choice.
'215
In two articles totaling 114 pages, Amar's response to the federalism
issue is limited to two pages in "Consent of the Governed," and perhaps a
few additional pages that could be said to deal with the topic indi-
rectly.216 In dealing with the federalism objection, Amar's initial confi-
dence seems to have deserted him.217 Retreating from his "confident...
conjecture" of a clear original understanding, Amar now says only that
"we" are given a "choice" of three paths: Jefferson Davis's, Madison's, or
Wilson's. 218 Focusing on the thoughts of a few individuals as though they
fully represent an era seems, to me, to be a dubious historical ap-
proach.219 Be that as it may, even by Amar's own account, his First Theo-
rem was not accepted by the leading thinkers of the day. Amar acknowl-
edges that a common understanding is lacking among his three chosen
representatives. 220 Madison stands firmly against him.221 If Amar views
Davis's thought, which does not support his Theorem, as a continuance
214. Isaac Kramnick, Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism: Political Ideology in
Late Eighteenth-Century England and America 261 (1991); see also William M. Treanor,
The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 Colum. L.
Rev. 782, 822-24 (1995). Treanor notes, in the context of liberalism and republicanism,
that modem writers reject "the assumption of a dominant ideological paradigm." Id. at
823.
215. Wechsler, supra note 104, at 543.
216. See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 2, at 506-07. Amar concedes
that he "gloss[es] over some important federalism issues," but notes that he has "addressed
[them] in considerable detail elsewhere." Id. at 488 n.15. See generally Amar,
Sovereignty, supra note 48.
217. See supra Part II (laying out Amar's argument).
218. See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 2, at 506-07.
219. For a similar viewpoint, see Bradford, Original Intentions, supra note 117, at 88
(confusion and misunderstanding have been caused by "the special status to which a
selected group of early American leaders have been elevated as the quintessence of what
the Founders had in mind.").
220. See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 2, at 506-07.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 127-147.
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of the original understanding in the southern states, the number of Foun-
ders who did not accept the First Theorem is very considerable indeed.
222
Even if Wilson might be read to support Amar's position, he did not
represent the thinking of significant numbers of his contemporaries.
While Wilson's legal thought was sophisticated and significant, 223 Wilson
did not exemplify the thinking of any party or region.2 2 4 Wilson did en-
dorse the view that a simple majority could change the frame of govern-
ment but did so only twice,2 2 and not in the context of Article V. When
Wilson did refer to Article V, he seems to have assumed that it prescribed
the exclusive mode for constitutional change.2 2 6 Perhaps Wilson did be-
lieve in an amendment power by a national "We the Majority." However,
if Wilson held such a belief, he did not express it.
D. Subsequent History
Even if we expand the scope of our inquiry beyond 1787, it is clear
that, throughout the nineteenth century, Article V was viewed as the ex-
clusive means of amending the Constitution. Moreover, even within the
states, where methods of constitutional change have been more flexible,
there is no indication that it has ever been possible to disregard estab-
lished mechanisms, and to amend state constitutional documents by a
bare majority vote of the electorate.
1. In General. - The first use of Article V occurred, of course, with
the adoption of the Bill of Rights. As is well known, Madison (respond-
ing to Anti-Federalist sentiment) was the driving force in securing passage
of the amendments.2 27 His proposed amendments included a "declara-
tion" that was to be "prefixed to the constitution":
That all power is originally vested in, and consequently de-
rived from the people.
That government is instituted, and ought to be exercised
for the benefit of the people; which consists in the enjoyment of
222. Amar finds Davis's belief that the people of each state retained their sovereignty
implausible. See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 2, at 507.
223. See Robert G. McCloskey, Introduction, in 1 The Works ofJames Wilson, supra
note 182, 1, 1-7 (discussing Wilson's contributions to modem legal thought).
224. See id. at 2-3.
225. It is only by implication that these statements can be understood as expressions
of the view that the people have the right to amend by simple majority. See James Wilson,
Remarks at the Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), in 2 Documentary History, supra
note 97, at 350, 862 ("[T]he people may change the constitution[ ] whenever and however
they please.");James Wilson, Remarks at the Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), in
2 Documentary History, supra note 97, at 382, 383 ("Those who ordain and establish have
the power, if they think proper, to repeal and annul."). See generally Moore, supra note
98, at 348-51 (contrasting differences and similarities between Madison and Wilson).
226. Indeed, in the state convention debates Wilson stated that even the state
constitution "cannot be amended by any other mode than that which it directs." 2 Elliot's
Debates, supra note 151, at 457 (statement ofJames Wilson).
227. See Smith, supra note 151, at 128-29.
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life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using property,
and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and in-
defeasible right to reform or change their government, when-
ever it be found adverse or inadequate to the purposes of its
institution.2
28
The much condensed preamble which was presented to the House when
debates began on August 13, 1789,229 was ultimately rejected without any
recorded discussion on August 19.230 Madison's last provision had al-
ready disappeared, yet Amar uses this provision as the basis of his argu-
ment.2 31 During the debates on the condensed preamble, no suggestion
was made that, if adopted, this declaration would have varied the amend-
ing process specified in Article V.232 To the contrary, the assumption
seems to have been that Article V sufficiently embodied the people's right
to alter their national government. In fact, none of the 200 amendments
proposed by the ratifying states concerned Article V.233 Indeed, when
recalcitrant Rhode Island finally ratified in 1791, it actually proposed to
restrict further the amendment process by requiring the approval of
eleven states.23
The nineteenth-century discussion of the amending process was a
rich and varied one.235 One of the most interesting and significant think-
228. Madison Resolution (June 8, 1789), in Creating The Bill of Rights, supra note
197, at 11, 11-12.
229. See Elias Boudinet, Remarks at the House of Representatives Debate (Aug. 13,
1789), in 2 The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 1066, 1066 (Bernard Schwartz ed.,
1971).
230. See House of Representatives Debate (Aug. 19, 1789), in 2 The Bill of Rights,
supra note 229, at 1125, 1126.
231. See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 2, at 491.
232. See House of Representatives Debate (Aug. 14, 1789), in 2 The Bill of Rights,
supra note 229, at 1076, 1076-77. Moreover in the very speech in which Madison
introduced the proposed amendments, he claimed that "the greatest danger lies.., in the
body of the people, operating by the majority against the minority." James Madison,
Remarks at the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), in 2 The Bill of Rights: A
Documentary History, supra note 229, at 1029, 1029.
233. See Amendments Proposed by the States; in Creating the Bill of Rights, supra
note 197, at 14-28.
234. See Orfield, supra note 31, at 185; Patrick T. Conley, Rhode Island: First in War,
Last in Peace, in The Constitution and the States, supra note 151, at 269, 282.
235. Amar's discussion of the subsequent history of the amendment process is largely
confined to a single paragraph. He states that:
Although the ideas presented above may strike modem readers as quixotic, late
eighteenth and nineteenth century lawyers would, I believe, have found my
account more comprehensible. See, for example, James Madison, Vices of the
Political System of the United States, in Meyers, Mind of the Founder at 82, 85...
("According to Republican Theory, Right and power [are] both vested in the
majority"); Federalist 39 (Madison), in Federalist Papers at 240, 246... ("Were [the
Constitution] wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside
in the majority of the people of the Union; and this authority would be competent
at all times, like that of a majority of every national society to alter or abolish its
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ers on this topic was John Calhoun, who is actually cited by Professor
Amar in support of his "We the Majority" theory.2 36 However, the letter
cited concerns the rights of "We the People" of South Carolina,237 not
the right of "We the Majority" of the United States to bypass Article V and
impose new restrictions on "We the People" of South Carolina.238 More
to the point, Calhoun's "Discourse" argued strongly that Article V's bur-
densome processes constituted the only way to amend the Constitution;
he feared that amendments by a bare majority "would expose the consti-
tution to hasty, inconsiderate, and even sinister amendments."
23 9
Calhoun argued that once any state had nullified federal legislation as
unconstitutional, the national government must invoke Article V to ac-
quire the necessary national authority.2 4° Pointing to the state-centered
and counter-majoritarian characteristics of Article V, Calhoun felt secure
that no such "increase" in federal (as against state) power would result by
way of amendment.241 If an increase in federal power did occur, how-
ever, that was valid, and secession was the only remaining route for any
disaffected state.
2 42
Moreover, there were many other diverse thinkers, such as St.
George Tucker andJoseph Story, who quite clearly viewed Article V as the
exclusive mode for amending the constitution.2 43 In his First Inaugural
Address, Lincoln summarized the American tradition aptly:
This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who in-
habit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing Govern-
ment, they can exercise their constitutional right of amending it
or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it....
established government.") ... ;John C. Calhoun, Letter to General Hamilton on
the subject of State Interposition, in 6 Works of John C. Calhoun 144, 146 (D.
Appleton, 1855) (similar); 6 Cong Deb 269 (1830) (remarks of Sen. Edward
Livingston) ....
Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 2, at 1102-03 n.209. Thus, Amar's references are
to Madison (especially Federalist No. 39), Livingston, and Calhoun. None supliorts him.
The citation of Madison is, to say the least, puzzling. After all, Amar acknowledges
throughout that Federalist No. 39 (indeed, the entire Federalist) contradicts his views on the
meaning of Article V. See id. at 1063-64.
236. See id. at 1102-03 n.209.
237. See Letter from John C. Calhoun to General James Hamilton, Jr. (Aug. 28,
1832), in 6 The Works of John C. Calhoun 144, 144 (Richard K. Crall ed., Russell &
Russell 1968) (1851-1856) (addressing the right of a state to defend its reserved powers
against encroachment by the federal government).
238. In fact, after describing the supposition that there is a collective American
people from which the Constitution derives its authority, Calhoun says, "[b ] ut, fortunately,
th[at] supposition is entirely devoid of truth." Id. at 147.
239. Calhoun, Discourse, supra note 148, at 291.
240. See id. at 296-302.
241. See id. at 303.
242. See id. at 301-02.
248. See Tucker, supra note 96, app. note D, at 371 ("Lastly, the fifth article provides
the mode by which future amendments to the constitution may be proposed, discussed,
and carried into effect, without hazarding a dissolution of the confederacy, or suspending
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While I make no recommendation of amendments, I fully recog-
nize the rightful authority of the people over the whole subject,
to be exercised in either of the modes prescribed in the instru-
ment itself .... 244
It thus appears that Lincoln did not imagine that the Constitution could
be amended other than through the process described in Article V.
Lincoln's way of thinking has continued to the present day.245 As
Professor Orfield has said, "[t]he principle that the people are sovereign
does not mean that they can change the constitution except as provided
therein."246 There have been some dissenters from this view, but in the
large majority of instances their appeal has been to norms outside the
Constitution. 247 Professor Amar stands alone in believing that the origi-
nal understanding contemplated amendment by "We the Majority."
2. State Practice. - The real heyday of popular sovereignty was not
1789 but a period extending from 1820 to 1880, when activity within the
states opened the political process to involvement by a broader spectrum
of people.248 In his stimulating work, Contested Truths, Daniel Rodgers
recounts that history.249 Rodgers notes that state constitutional conven-
tions were widespread during this era, and talk of popular sovereignty
filled the air: "Where the characteristic text for natural rights was the
the operations of the existing government. And this may be effectuated in two different
modes. .. ."); 3 Story, supra note 61, § 960 ("Nor ... can we too much applaud a
constitution which thus provides a safe and peaceable remedy for its own defects.. . ."); id.
§ 955 ("The fifth article of the constitution respects the mode of making amendments to
it."); id. § 956 ("The great principle ... is to make the changes practicable, but not too easy
One exception to the general view of Article V as exclusive was Sidney George Fisher
who, in 1862, denounced Article V as ineffective and urged that Congress could amend on
its own. See Sidney G. Fisher, The Trial of the Constitution 84-85 (Negro Univ. Press
1969) (1862).
244. First Inaugural Address of Abraham Lincoln (Mar. 4, 1861), in 6 A Compilation
of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, at 10 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1899).
245. I am aware of only one proposed amendment-offered to avoid the Civil War-
that consciously would have bypassed Article V. See Bernstein & Agel, supra note 130, at
86 (referring to Jefferson Davis's proposal to protect slavery). Even that proposal,
however, did not invoke a resort to "We the Majority" but instead required all slave states to
approve any amendments concerning slavery. See id.
246. Orfield, supra note 31, at 39 (emphasis added).
247. See, e.g., William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of
America 12 (1825) (stating that the amendment processes stipulated in state and federal
constitutions are not binding on the people although it is most convenient to adhere to
them).
248. The "states have used the popular referendum as the exclusive mode of
ratification of amendments to and revision of the state constitutions ever since about
1830." Orfield, supra note 31, at 192. In "Philadelphia Revisited" and "Consent of the
Governed," Amar makes only a faint appeal to what happened in state constitutional
conventions during the nineteenth century. See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra
note 2, at 498; Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 2, at 1058 & n.28, 1066.
249. See generally Daniel T. Rodgers, Contested Truths: Keywords in American
Politics Since Independence 80-111 (1987).
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manifesto, the people's forum was the constitutional convention. Here
the claims of the people's sovereignty were concentrated, defined, and
fiercely debated."25 0 I need not here recount the historical details. Suf-
fice it to say that "We the People," that "massive figure of speech,"
25 1
constituted "words employed in a battle for admission to politics, for con-
trol over its offices, or for power over its policies." 252 Behind this rheto-
ric, "white, male farmers and mechanics... had pushed ... hard against
the older concentrations of power. ' 253 When others (women, free
blacks) sought the same access, the concept of popular sovereignty un-
derwent strain.2
4
Moreover, although "We the Majority" of Illinois may have invoked
popular sovereignty in justifying an amendment to their state constitu-
tion, they did not necessarily believe that the United States Constitution
could be amended by a national "We the Majority." Rodgers states that
these state conventions, with one exception, were lawfully called, or else
were subsequently approved, by state legislatures.2 5 5 The exception arose
out of Rhode Island's well-known "Dorr Rebellion."
Under Rhode Island law (the "Charter"), only landholders and their
eldest sons could vote; additionally, the Charter contained no provision
for amendment!25 6 Seeking to expand this minuscule and malappor-
tioned electorate, Rhode Islanders, including Thomas W. Dorr, called a
constitutional convention in 1841 after the state legislature (the "Charter
government") had repeatedly refused to do so.2 5 7 A large majority of the
(then relevant) "We the People" of Rhode Island adopted the conven-
tion's proposal.2 58 Nonetheless, the supreme court of the state rejected
the new constitution and the Supreme Court of the United States de-
clined to intervene.
259
Dorr himself directly justified his conduct on the ground that "We
the Majority" could alter the frame of government at will.2 60 In the
Supreme Court, however, his counsel advanced additional grounds.
While Dorr's counsel did refer to the right of "We the Majority," he also
argued that Dorr's conduct was lawful because the legislature had refused
to sanction constitutional change and the Rhode Island Charter provided
250. Id. at 93.
251. Id. at 80.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 102.
254. See id. at 108-09.
255. See id. at 103.
256. See id. at 102, 106. The call for a convention was supported by such groups as
manufacturers, merchants, and mechanics. See id. at 103. Interestingly, at the time of the
ratification of the Constitution, the Rhode Island legislature was widely perceived to be
radically democratic. See Conley, supra note 234, at 269-70.
257. Rodgers, supra note 249, at 103.
258. See id.
259. See id. at 103-04.
260. See id. at 106.
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no other way to alter the frame of government. 26' Daniel Webster was
among the defenders of the ancien regime; he began his argument by cate-
gorically acknowledging the principle of popular sovereignty: "Every one
believes this" to be "[t]he first" principle. 262 However, Webster specifi-
cally invoked Article V to show that popular sovereignty did not invariably
entail constitutional change by "We the Majority."2 63 Webster insisted
that "We the People" of Rhode Island could not go behind their constitu-
tional structure. In this, incidentally, he was supported by Calhoun, who
denounced the Dorr government. 264 According to one commentator,
Calhoun believed that "[a]llowing the government to accept the right of
a simple numerical majority to change a state's constitution would lead to
anarchy."265 Calhoun was perhaps fearful that the legitimation of the
Dorr government would induce a belief that, acting outside of Article V, a
simple majority of a national "We the People" could threaten slavery.
266
Professor Amar's description of the Dorr Rebellion is puzzling. It
appears in yet another article, one in which he insists that the Founders
intended the Guarantee Clause (which Amar refers to as the Republican
Government Clause) to "reaffirm[ ] basic principles of popular sover-
eignty."267 Amar seeks to avoid the issue of majority rule: "The key issue
in the case was not whether the charter regime was Republican, but
whether it was a Government."268 Both the Dorr government and the
Charter government, Amar says, were "Republican," and the Court wisely
avoided choosing between two republican governments. 269 If the Dorr
government were recognized, "chaos" would take place, because to do so
would invalidate all "governmental action-marriages, land transfers,
criminal convictions, and the like-that had taken place in the in-
terim."270 In fact, it is far from clear that these actions would be invali-
dated.27' But Amar's difficulties are deeper than this. No basis exists for
261. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 19-20 (1849).
262. Id. at 29.
263. See id. at 30.
264. SeeJohn R. Vile,John C. Calhoun on the Guarantee Clause, 40 S.C. L. Rev. 667,
681-82 (1989).
265. Id. at 682.
266. See id.
267. Amar, Republican Government, supra note 55, at 762.
268. Id. at 776. Amar considers, but apparently rejects, the argument that the
ratification of Dorr's "People's Constitution" was not binding because it did not occur at a
regularly called election. See id. at 774-75. Webster had made a similar argument:
"There must be an authentic mode of ascertaining the public will somehow and
somewhere." Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 20, 31 (1849). This line of argument is
utterly unconvincing. No reason exists why the expression of the people's will had to occur
at regularly scheduled elections. Such elections may well be reliable barometers of what
"We the Majority's" precise will is, but they certainly are not the exclusive determinants
thereof. See Amar, Republican Government, supra note 55, at 776.
269. See Amar, Republican Government, supra note 55, at 776.
270. Id.
271. See, e.g., Baldy v. Hunter, 171 U.S. 388, 392-93 (1898) ("[A]cts necessary to
peace and good order... which would be valid if emanating from a lawful government,
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believing that the Charter government met the most minimal require-
ments of a popular government. By contrast, the Dorrite efforts to
change the frame of government were as similar in spirit to the adoption
of the American Constitution as any movement for constitutional change
that we are likely to see. There had been three elections: the call for the
constitutional convention (which has been described as a "carefully or-
ganized extralegal election, open to every white male in the state"), ratifi-
cation by "a second, heavily subscribed, extralegal election," and finally, a
submission to the electorate on the decision to elect officials.272 Against
that backdrop, Amar never explains what claim the Charter government
had to be a legitimate government, or even a legal one.
2 73
IV. 'WE THE PEOPLE" AND DEMOCRACY
A second, more subtle, flaw exists in Amar's historical conception of
"We the People": He ignores the fact that the Constitution was designed
to prevent all unmediated lawmaking by the people. He does so by in-
vesting the original Constitution with a "democratic quality" that it clearly
was not intended to possess.
A. We the People
Vox populi, vox Dei. "We the People" is a concept with a long his-
tory.2 74 Historically, it was employed to describe the source of political
authority, not the mode of its exercise. In English history, it was a banner
raised in opposition to the divine right of kings, 2 7 5 itself a banner that
had been raised in resistance to apostolic authority.2 76 (As Edmund
Morgan points out in his splendid study, Inventing the People, "[t]he way to
fight divinity is with divinity.") 277 But the fact that the people have some-
times reigned has never meant that they actually ruled.
"By the eighteenth century [in America], the sovereignty of the peo-
ple was taken for granted."278 However, the actual meaning of this con-
must be regarded in general as valid if proceeding from an actual, though unlawful
government.").
272. See Rodgers, supra note 249, at 103.
273. See id. at 102 ("Rhode Island stood alone in having no written constitution. Its
legislature possessed in theory a virtually unlimited sphere of action .... ").
274. "Who, today speaks of 'We the People,' other than demagogues, originalists, and
Yale law professors?" So wrote Professor Rubenfeld, himself such a professor. Jed
Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104Yale LJ. 1119, 1147 (1995). Actually,
I am not sure that originalists should rely on the concept, and one must note that interest
in "We the People" has now spread to the Harvard Law School. See, e.g., Richard D.
Parker, Here the People Rule 112-15 (1994) (lamenting the fact that the people do not
rule).
275. See Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People 56 (1988).
276. See id. at 18.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 143. I believe it an overstatement to say, as David Dow does, that "the
notion of popular sovereignty... [is] primarily [of] interest[ ] to academics," but I agree
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cept was subject to debate, even then. No necessary connection existed
between popular sovereignty-which is concerned with the source of
political authority-and majority rule.2 79 Rather, the implications of
popular sovereignty evolved over time, and Amar rightly observes that, at
the time the Constitution was ratified, Americans increasingly recognized
the right of "We the Majority" to change their frame of government.280
In terms of the Constitution's history, "We the People" makes its ap-
pearance only late in the Convention's proceedings. 28' Max Farrand
writes:
The articles of confederation formed an agreement "between
the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,...."
and the rest of the thirteen. At one stage of the development of
its report, the committee of detail tried in the preamble "We the
People of and the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island," etc., but later the "and" was dropped out. When
the committee of style took up this point they found themselves
confronted with a new difficulty. The convention had voted that
the new constitution might be ratified by nine states and should
go into effect between the states so ratifying, and no human
power could name those states in advance. How far this was the
controlling factor and what other motives may have been at
work, we have no record. The simple fact remains that the com-
mittee of style cleverly avoided the difficulty before them by
phrasing the preamble:-"We, the People of the United
States." 282
that it is "far less important than the principle of majority rule, which concerns us all."
Dow, supra note 38, at 13.
279. "A common fallacy confuses the framers' principle of popular sovereignty, the
principle that legitimate power must be derived from the governed, with its exercise
through unmediated direct lawmaking." Hans A. Linde, Who Is Responsible for
Republican Government?, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 709, 719 (1994). The legal failure of the
Dorr rebellion can be understood to highlight the distinction between the two. Calhoun
expressly rejected any effort to reduce popular sovereignty to majority vote, arguing that
one should not attribute to a part the qualities of the whole. See Calhoun, Discourse,
supra note 148, at 23-24. Or, as Dow expresses it, "Popular sovereignty is not necessarily
majority will .... [Although it] can be understood as fifty percent plus one, it can also be
understood as a plurality, a supermajority, or even the will of an appointed oligarchy of
lawmakers." Dow, supra note 38, at 13.
280. See Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 2, at 1050-51. By 1789, a strong
but by no means inexorable link existed between majority choice at the state level and "We
the People." Indeed, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 had been approved by "We
the People," but ratification was conditioned upon a two-thirds majority. See Ronald M.
Peters, Jr., The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780: A Social Compact 22-23 (1978).
281. The phrase does, however, appear in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.
See Mass. Const. of 1780, pmbl., in 1 The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial
Charters and Other Organic Laws of the United States 936, 957 (Ben P. Poole ed., 2d ed.
1924) ("We, therefore, the people of Massachusetts . . . do agree upon, ordain, and
establish the following declaration of rights and frame of government... ").
282. Fan-and, Framing, supra note 121, at 190-91.
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This change was first proposed on September 12th, less than one week
before the Convention came to an end.28 3
"Popular sovereignty" is a term that does not appear anywhere in the
Constitution or in The Federalist, although the terms "popular govern-
ment" and "popular assemblies" appear in The Federalist twenty-six
times. 28 4 In 1942, Lester Orfield wrote that "[t]he Constitution nowhere
expressly refers to the people as sovereign. The assertions in the Declara-
tion of Independence of the inalienable rights ... to alter and abolish the
government are nowhere repeated."
285
Morgan characterizes the whole idea of "We the People" as a "fic-
tion."28 6 Like comparable fictions, however, this idea has real power be-
cause it "create [s] ... pictures in our heads which make the structures of
authority tolerable and understandable."28 7 However, the existence of "a
People that acts in identifiable ways and speaks in comprehensible tones"
may be simply a "political myth."288 To the extent that the concept of
"We the People" entails actual hands-on rule, these objections have
force-especially because the Constitution does not contemplate the di-
rect participation of "We the People" in ordinary lawmaking. 289 Admit-
tedly, even in the arena of normal politics, the concept cannot be alto-
283. See Report of the Committee of Style (Sept. 12, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra note
116, at 590, 590.
284. See Kammen, supra note 89, at 22.
285. Orfield, supra note 31, at 143. In fact, in the Constitution "the term sovereignty
is totally unknown." Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 454 (1793) (Wilson, J.).
286. See Morgan, supra note 275, at 14; see also Rodgers, supra note 249, at 5 (calling
terms like this "elusive").
287. Rodgers, supra note 249, at 5.
288. Powell, supra note 209, at 200-01; see also Frederick Schauer, Deliberating
About Deliberation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1187, 1196 (1992) (criticizing as "strained"
Ackerman's claims about "what the people were actually talking about in 1787, 1791, 1866,
or 1937"). "The basic problem with postulating a theory whereby the political climate
yields constitutional text is that reading electoral politics is only slightly less fatuous than
reading tea leaves." Dow, supra note 38, at 47.
289. Madison acknowledged that the democracies of Greece and other ancient
regimes understood the concept of representation. See The Federalist No. 63, at 386-87
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). He then said that "[tihe true distinction
between these and the American Governments lies in the total exclusion of the people.. . from
any share in the latter." Id. at 387. Madison was not quite right. He overlooked the
important role that juries were expected to play in the actual administration of the
national government. See Henry P. Monaghan, Book Review, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 296, 309
n.47 (1980) (reviewingJesse H. ChoperJudicial Review and the National Political Process
(1980)) ("thejury diffused authority because every governmentally imposed sanction...
needed the concurrence of 12 citizens"). Indeed, Amar has made this argument himself.
See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1133 (1991)
("[T]he Bill of Rights ... ensured that ordinary citizens would participate in the federal
administration of justice through various jury-trial provisions ... ."); Akhil R. Amar,
ReinventingJuries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1169, 1169 (1995) ("No
idea was more central to our Bill of Rights-indeed, to America's distinctive regime of
government of the people, by the people, and for the people-than the idea of thejury.").
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gether dismissed.290 Applied to such acts as voting, the idea of 'We the
People" helps capture our understanding of our experience. Nonethe-
less, even here the construct cannot be pushed too far. It is, after all,
important to recall that in our over 200 years under the Constitution, that
Constitution has never seen a national "We the People" vote on anything.
For constitutional purposes, voting on every issue, from presidential elec-
tions on down, has always been state by state.
291
Morgan credits Madison with having invented the concept of an
"American people" as a vehicle for controlling the Federalists' real oppo-
nents: the state legislatures. 292 This seems to be an overstatement if
taken literally. Morgan means, I believe, that Madison provided a power-
ful articulation of a pre-existing concept of a national "We the People."
Nonetheless, an adjacent, countervailing, and often contradictory, notion
of "We the People of Delaware, of Connecticut," and so on, also ex-
isted.293 During secession, the southern states heavily emphasized that
notion. They believed that conventions of "We the People" in each of the
several states could sever the bonds of union, just as similar conventions
had forged those bonds. 294 Amar's treatment of the secessionist under-
standing is worth noting:
To take one final example, the theory ofJefferson Davis and his
fellow secessionists in 1861 was simple and clear: (1) Article V is
not the exclusive mode of legitimate constitutional change; (2)
We the People retain the right to alter or abolish our govern-
ment at any time, and for any reason; (3) We the People exer-
cise this right by simple majority rule in special convention; and
(4) the relevant people is the people of each state. This was a
theory that hundreds of thousands fought and died for. And, as
I understand him, President Lincoln crossed swords with "Presi-
dent" Davis only over proposition Number 4, insisting-quite
rightly, in my view-that secession could take place only if ap-
proved by a national majority, and not a mere statewide one.295
The first prong of this analysis is, I believe, completely wrong. Davis is
not talking about "legitimate constitutional change" within the framework
290. See, e.g., Kammen, supra note 89, at 23.
291. Voting in Congress, even if unanimous, cannot count because "We the People"
theorists insist upon a rigorous separation between the People and their representatives.
292. See Morgan, supra note 275, at 267. Surprisingly, Amar does not even mention
Morgan, whose study ends at the founding, or Rodgers, supra note 249, who extends the
analysis into the mid-nineteenth century.
293. See Berger, supra note 66, at 21-47 (emphasizing "We the People" of the several
states).
294. They then came together to form a union of the several Southern States. See
William C. Davis, A Government of Our Own 5 (1994) (providing a fascinating account of
the process and use of the federal Constitution as a model for the confederacy).
295. Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 2, at 499.
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of an existing constitutional order. Rather, Davis is talking about seced-
ing from that order.
2 96
B. Democracy and 1789
In focusing upon "We the People" and the mode by which the Con-
stitution was ratified, most "We the People" devotees invest the Constitu-
tion of 1787 with a strongly democratic quality.2 97 For example, Profes-
sor Amar says:
But-Charles Beard notwithstanding-the act of the constitu-
tion was not some antidemocratic, Thermidorian counterrevolu-
tion, akin to a coup d'etat, but was instead the most par-
ticipatory and majoritarian event the planet had ever seen (and
lawful to boot).2
98
Of course, this supposed opposition is a false one: the most democratic
constitution in the world may also have been an effort by the Framers to
slow down democracy.2 99 But my objection cuts much deeper than that.
Amar's summary rejection of a "Thermidorian" description of the
Constitution refers only to a single work by Charles Beard. There is a
whole school of Progressive historians, including Gordon Wood, who
viewed the Constitution in anti-democratic, or at least, democracy-re-
straining, terms.300 Professor Wood writes:
296. If Davis "and his fellow secessionists in 1861" carried on a strain of American
political thought that had been in existence since 1789, one that stresses "We the People"
of the several states, Amar's general thesis, that there was one predominant understanding
in 1789, collapses.
297. See, e.g., Beer, supra note 85, at 317-25 (arguing that a sovereign American
people existed and used their authority to ordain the Constitution).
298. Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 2, at 496.
299. Recall the words of Sherman: "The people immediately should have as little to
do as may be about the Government. They want information and are constantly liable to
be misled." Roger Sherman, Remarks in Debate (May 31, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note
116, at 45, 48. In contrasting Greek and Roman government with American government,
Madison wrote "It]he true distinction between these and the American Governments lies
in the total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity from any share in the latter...."
The Federalist No. 63, at 387 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Many writers
have been troubled by the difficulty of reconciling popular sovereignty with the
governmental processes specified in the Constitution. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, The
Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 893, 894 (1990). The relationship between
interest group theory and popular sovereignty is intriguing. On occasion, our supposedly
representative government simply ratifies an interest group's program. See, e.g., Allied
Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. 486 U.S. 492, 501 (1988); U.S. R.R. Retirement
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 189-93 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Additionally,
administrative implementation of Congressional policy can be conditioned upon the
assent of those regulated. See, e.g., Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111, 115-16 (1942).
300. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 103. This omission is particularly surprising in view
of Amar's treatment of Gordon Wood. At several points, Amar calls Wood the leading
historian of the period. See, e.g., Amar, Republican Government, supra note 56, at 753.
Yet, in the very work cited by Amar, Gordon Wood expresses a viewpoint directly contrary
to Amar on this crucial point.
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[T]he general interpretation of the Progressive generation of
historians-that the Constitution was in some sense an aristo-
cratic document designed to curb the democratic excesses of
the Revolution-still seems to me to be the most helpful frame-
work for understanding the politics and ideology surrounding
the Constitution. 30 1
In The Radicalism of the American Revolution, Wood once again emphasizes
a cultural and economic pattern in which the 1789 Constitution was a
temporary interruption of a much wider movement toward equality.
30 2
"The founding fathers were unsettled and fearful not because the Ameri-
can Revolution had failed but because it had succeeded, and succeeded
only too well."30 3
Wood does not stand alone. Matthews stresses that "[t]he
Constitution of 1787, in contrast [to the American Revolution], repre-
sented a centralized, rational form of rule, a victory for the 'government,'
'authority' and 'power' over 'liberty,' ",304 a result accomplished by "the
total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity" from govern-
ment that restricted individuals to a "very rare participation."30 5 Isaac
Kramnick writes, "Madison's brilliant achievement [in The Federalist] was
the appropriation of a word [i.e., republicanism] with unmistakable pop-
ulist connotations for a governmental structure which, while ultimately
based on popular consent, involved a serious diminution of popular par-
301. Wood, supra note 103, at 626. Professor Wood notes that the impetus for
constitutional reform at the time of the convention was the "unsteadiness of the people,"
and quotes Benjamin Franklin as saying "[wie have been guarding against an evil that old
States are most liable to, excess ofpower in the rulers... but our present danger seems to be
defect of obedience in the subjects." Id. at 432. A wave of new state constitutions-
Massachusetts in 1780, New Hampshire in 1784, and Jefferson's draft for a new
constitution in Virginia written in the early 1780s-embraced a more powerful executive as
a check on the excesses of the popular branch. See id. at 435-36. In debates about
reforming the most democratic of the early constitutions, that of Pennsylvania, a group
calling itself the Republicans (includingJames Wilson) argued that an unchecked unitary
legislature was as much a threat to liberty as the monarchy had ever been. See id. at
438-40. The political turmoil and popular discontent with state governance that
dominated the 1780s, Wood concludes, engendered a shift in reform efforts away from a
state-by-state effort to check the excesses of democracy, towards a national solution. "It was
'the vile State governments,' rather than simply the feebleness of the Confederation, that
were the real 'sources of pollution,' preventing America from 'being a nation.'" Id. at 467.
Wood also lays out the more general argument that the impulse for reform revolved
around the attempt to save republicanism from itself-the "worthy against the licentious."
See id. at 471-75. "Most Revolutionary leaders clung tightly to the concept of a ruling
elite, presumably based on merit, but an elite nonetheless-a natural aristocracy embodied
in the eighteenth-century ideal of an educated and cultivated gentleman." Id. at 480; see
also Anderson, supra note 44, at 7, 118 (concluding that Constitutional drafters built
undemocratic features into Constitution to bind the excesses of popular will).
302. See Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 230-32, 327
(1991). Amar does not cite this work.
303. Id. at 368-69.
304. Matthews, supra note 107, at 13.
305. David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of The Federalist 145 (1984).
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ticipation."30 6 Nearly a century ago, Andrew McLaughlin stated that
"[t]he convention was deeply impressed with the extravagances of the
populace... [and] imbued with reactionary dread of popular fickleness
and folly."
3 0 7
Understanding the Constitution as a reaction to the democratic "ex-
cesses" of the post-revolutionary era is now deeply ingrained in American
thinking, at least outside the law schools.3 0 8 In 1789, "We the People" got
little more than the right to vote for one branch of the government every
two years. In Hannah Arendt's words, "[o]nly the representatives of the
people, not the people themselves, had an opportunity to engage in
those activities of expressing, discussing, and deciding which in a positive
sense are the activities of freedom."30 9 Simply put, "[t]he Convention did
not aim at democracy, or even at majority rule. It rejected the notion of
popular sovereignty-as anything more than political rhetoric."
3 10
Prefiguring Charles Beard, J. Allen Smith's The Spirit of American Gov-
ernment is particularly instructive.3 1 ' Smith completely shared Amar's
deep commitment to democracy. Smith believed, however, that democ-
racy had little to do with the 1787 Constitution. Fear of democracy, how-
ever, did:
This dread of the consequences of popular government was
shared to a greater or less extent by nearly all members of that
Convention. Their aim was to find a cure for what they con-
ceived to be the evils of an excess of democracy.
"Complaints," says Madison in The Federalist, "are every-
where heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens,
equally the friends of public and private faith, and public and
personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the
public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and
that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules
ofjustice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior
force of an interested and overbearing majority."
306. Isaac Kramnick, Introduction, in The Federalist 11, 41 (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987); see also Marci A. Hamilton, Discussion and Decisions: A Proposal to Replace the
Myth of Self-Rule with an Attorneyship Model of Representation, 69 N.Y.U. L Rev. 477,
515 (1994) (collecting sources on Madison's elitism).
307. Andrew C. McLaughlin, James Wilson in the Philadelphia Convention, 12 Pol.
Sci. Q. 1, 15 (1897). He adds that by contrast, "Wilson ... was given over to the democratic
faith. He was not patronizing to the populace or condescending,-quite the reverse.
Filled with the democracy of the next century, he considered himself the servant of the
people, and sought to minister to them." Id.
308. But see Kammen, supra note 89, at 45-46 ("In the nineteenth century, for
example, John Quincy Adams, John C. Calhoun, Edward Everett, and... Joseph Story
shared a firm belief that the great charter produced in 1787 embodied a fulfillment of the
spirit of 1776.").
309. Hannah Arendt, On Revolution 235 (Pelican Books 1981) (1963).
310. Anderson, supra note 44, at xiv.




This criticism of the American government of the Revolu-
tionary period gives us the point of view of the framers of the
Constitution. We should remember, however, that the so-called
majority rule to which Madison attributed the evils of that time
had nothing in common with majority rule as that term is now
understood. Under the laws then in force the suffrage was
greatly restricted, while the high property qualifications re-
quired for office-holding had the effect in many cases of placing
the control of legislation in the hands of the wealthier part of
the community. But undemocratic as the system was, it was not
sufficiently undemocratic to suit the framers of the Constitution.
It was no part of their plan to establish a government which the
people could control. In fact, popular control was what they
were seeking to avoid.
One means of accomplishing this was to make amendment
difficult, and this accordingly was done. We need not be sur-
prised that no provision was made for its original adoption, or
subsequent amendment by direct popular vote.312
In ending the foregoing paragraph, Smith assails the anti-democratic
character of the ratification process. "Let us not forget," Smith adds,
"that at no stage of the proceedings was the matter referred directly to
the people."313 Citing Lord Bryce, Smith states that "[o]f one thing we
may be reasonably certain-the Constitution did not represent the polit-
ical views of a majority of the American people-probably not even a
majority of those entitled to vote."3 14 Anderson echoes this theme, as I
have already noted.3 15
Criticism that equates the anti-democratic nature of the ratification
process with the amendment process is misguided, however. Ratification
was, first and foremost, about federalism-the terms upon which the sev-
eral states would unite. Second, for its time, ratification by popular con-
vention was a remarkably "democratic" process. Constitutional conven-
tions embodied the sovereignty of the people. "The people chose it for a
specific purpose, not to govern, but to set up institutions of government
.... Such was the theory, and it was a distinctively American one.
'3 16
That being said, however, the fact remains that the amendment pro-
cess is open to challenge as decidedly democracy-restraining. Smith
312. Id. at 42-43. "Yet the people do not participate in a single stage of the amending
process. The Constitution was not directly adopted by the people, nor is it amendable
directly by them." Orfield, supra note 31, at 215-16. This argument is not as powerful as it
appears because it fails to give weight to the Convention as an expression of the people.
313. Smith, supra note 311, at 49.
314. Id. at 50.
315. See Anderson, supra note 44, at 155-63.
316. 1 Robert R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution 214-15 (1959).
Moreover, Orfield notes that the "fact of ratification by such conventions was early asserted
to prove the national, rather than the federal, character of the Constitution. This mode of
ratification may therefore be described as the national method, and that by the state
legislatures as the federal." Orfield, supra note 31, at 53.
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wrote: "The fact that the people can not directly propose, or even ratify
changes in the fundamental law, is a substantial check upon democracy.
But in addition to this, another check was provided in the extraordinary
majority necessary to amend the Constitution."3 17 Smith goes on to state
that the fact that "such a small minority... [could] prevent reform" is
irreconcilable "with the general belief that in this country the majority
rules."318 He added:
An examination of these features of the various state consti-
tutions in force in 1787 shows clearly the reactionary character
of the Federal Constitution. It repudiated entirely the doctrine
then expressly recognized in some of the states and virtually in
all, that a majority of the qualified voters could amend the fun-
damental law. And not only did it go farther than any state con-
stitution in expressly limiting the power of the majority, but it
provided what no state constitution had done-the means by
which its limitations on the power of the majority could be
enforced.3 1 9
Anderson correctly notes that "[p]erhaps no other part of the Constitu-
tion has been more universally regarded as undemocratic than has the
amending article."3 20 To be sure, the Constitution reflects popular sover-
eignty, but it was also designed to ensure that the "people," however con-
ceived, reigned but never ruled. Even more importantly, the Constitu-
tion reflected the Framers' fear of direct democracy.3 21 The Constitution
of 1789 rejected direct lawmaking by the people, both in enacting ordi-
nary legislation and in changing the frame of government.
V. CURRENT CONCERNS
Amar's historical argument is deeply unpersuasive. Reframed, how-
ever, as a matter of contemporary principle, his argument is surely attrac-
tive. "Amar equates American constitutionalism with popular sovereignty
and popular sovereignty with the immediate, if deliberative, will of the
317. Smith, supra note 811, at 44. During the debates, "[n]o proposal was aimed at
guaranteeing the support of a popular majority for amendments. Nor was it suggested that
ratification by states containing a majority of the national population should be sufficient."
Anderson, supra note 44, at 158.
318. Smith, supra note 811, at 46.
319. Id. at 61-62. Anderson puts it thus:
Why were no voices raised, like Wilson's before the Connecticut compromise,
eloquently arguing for the people, not the states, as the foundation of the system?
.. no such debate took place. Instead, attention centered on the dangers to the
separate states and the conditions under which they would agree to be bound by
the other states.
Anderson, supra note 44, at 159.
320. Anderson, supra note 44, at 155.
321. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 Yale LJ. 1503,
1522-26 (1990) (discussing Framers' "solutions" to the threat of majority rule).
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majority."3 22 In any just constitutional order, why should that not be the
fundamental principle of the polity?
3 23
An adequate response to Amar on these policy grounds would re-
quire a lengthy essay, at the very least. Here, I want only to outline my
concerns. I acknowledge, of course, that no constitution that consistently
frustrates the strongly-held views of a sizeable majority over any signifi-
cant period of time can claim to be democratic. Having said that, I have
considerable doubts about the wisdom of constitution-making by '"We the
Majority."
Constitutions should not be viewed sub specie aeternitatis: to my mind,
constitutional regimes should not be ordered with eyes focused too far
down the road. Given my skeptical, short-range vision, Amar's proposal is
troublesome in contemporary terms, simply because Amar-style popular
sovereignty amendments are increasingly technologically feasible.3 24 If
implemented, Amar's proposal could significantly alter the fundamental
frame of government. (After all, Amar nowhere explains why Congress
should ever use Article V rather than appeal to call-in democracy.) The
role of the states envisaged by the Connecticut Compromise and Article V
could be seriously altered, but that, I confess, does not trouble me-par-
ticularly with the extensive "devolution" now occurring in the national
political process. What does concern me is the potential impact of Amar-
style proposals on representative government and on our aspirations for
both liberty and equality. At least since Walter Lippmann's work on pub-
322. Vile, Legally Amending, supra note 38, at 303 (citing Amar, Philadelphia
Revisited, supra note 2, at 1060 n.12). Vile points out that the latter equation is hardly self-
evident. See id. (citing Max Radin, The Intermittent Sovereign, 39 Yale LJ. 514, 526
(1930)). However, 13 states do permit initiative amendments by a simple majority of the
popular vote. See Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Change and Direct Democracy, 66 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 143, 149 n.23 (1995).
323. Indeed, I feel almost estopped to object to such a "First Theorem." In my view,
the national representatives of "We the People" have effectively transformed the original
understanding of the Constitution in virtually every area, from federalism to separation of
powers to civil liberties. If I am prepared to accept such transformative changes as part of
our constitutional law, as I am, how can I deny that the constitutional order can be
rearranged by the People themselves when their view can be known with some confidence?
This question poses a difficult problem for me, viewed as a matter of first principle. See
Monaghan, supra note 31. Nonetheless, my own intellectual difficulties quite plainly do
not establish the positive of Amar's historical case. I also recognize that there is significant
current academic interest in the old claim that the Constitution is too difficult to amend.
For a discussion of an early proposal to reform Article V, see Orfield, supra note 31, at
168-221.
324. See generally Barry Krusch, The 21st Century Constitution: A New America for a
New Millennium (1992). This young computer expert proposes that the existing
constitutional structure be revised so as to place modem information and communications
technologies at its core, and through that process invest ordinary citizens with effective,
hands-on political power. See id. at 258-76; see also Lawrence K Grossman, The
Electronic Republic 158 (1995) (foreseeing Congress's representative role diminishing as
modem communications technology allows "more direct citizen involvement through
advisory or even binding national referenda and ballot initiatives, and petitions to initiate
legislation as well as veto laws already passed").
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lic opinion,325 the role of the "demos" in politics has been a topic of
debate. In an era of talk show politics, single issue platforms, and media-
oriented presidents and national figures, Federalist No. 43's caution
against an "easy" amendment process takes on a special appeal. 326 It is
no secret that the "growing popularity of amendment politics [in the last
decade] suggests that the people-or those who purport to speak for
them-are increasingly dissatisfied with the course of normal politics." 32
7
Whereas in the past, popular sovereignty became a battle cry for those
expressing yearnings for inclusion into the political and social order,328
in the hands of current powerholders "We the People" seems likely to
justify exclusion, defining what "Real Americans" stand for. Consider the
potential results of national "We the Majority" referenda on such issues as
school prayer, homosexual rights, affirmative actionJudeo-Christian (or
maybe just Christian) values, and so on.
I view such prospects as a "bad" development. "Bad" not simply be-
cause the expected results would contradict my own value system (though
that is what I expect), but "bad" because "We the Majority" amendments
would remove emotionally charged issues from normal politics with its
messy but ameliorative compromises. Significant displacement of normal
politics by the politics of constitutional amendment would effectively
compromise what remains of the underlying premise of representative
government.32 9 The safeguards for individual liberty and minority rights
built into Article V's super-majoritarian and federalism requirements
would also be compromised. Additionally, it is probable that a push to-
wards direct democracy would, because of the ideologized character of
the amendments, weaken the Constitution as the symbol of national unity
and stability.330 Increased intolerance, not increased tolerance, could be
expected.
325. See generally Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (1922).
326. See The Federalist No. 43, at 278-79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); see also 2 Story, supra note 61, at 679 ("The great principle to be sought is to make
the changes practicable, but not too easy; to secure due deliberation, and caution ...
327. Bernstein & Agel, supra note 130, at 262.
328. See Rodgers, supra note 249, at 84-92 (recounting the history of popular
sovereignty movements).
329. For a thoughtful examination of the implications of increasingly utilized
plebiscites, see Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with
Plebiscites, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 527 (1994). Judge Easterbrook has wondered whether
anything is left of the original conception of representative government. See Frank H.
Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107
Harv. L. Rev. 1328, 1334 (1994) ("Indeed... some students of the subject believe.., that
one may understand the voting of public officials solely by reference to their constituents'
economic interests.").
330. "Every tribe needs its totem and its fetish, and the Constitution is ours." Max
Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 Yale L.J. 1290, 1294 (1937).
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Interestingly, Amar distances himself from these consequences of
undiluted majoritarianism. 331 In a footnote in "Philadelphia Revisited,"
he argues that some "popular" amendments might be rejected by
courts.3 32 In "Consent of the Governed," Amar greatly expands the latter
suggestion. He suggests several possible limitations on the amendment
power of 'We the Majority."5 33 First, Amar quotes Wilson in order to
make an appeal to natural law3 34-the very kind of appeal which was
thrown up against the appointment ofJustice Thomas. 3 5 The difficulties
with natural law theories need not be explored here, but it would take yet
another article for Amar to demonstrate that his conception of natural
law could be employed lawfully to check the will of his "We the Majority."
Amar's other arguments turn out to have similar difficulties. He posits an
"unamendable" Constitution, i.e., he claims ,that certain constitutional
amendments must be rejected because they do not "fit" the American
constitutional order.33 6 (Like his appeal to natural law, this proposal has
many precursors.)3 3 7 What this amounts to in the end is that Amar seems
prepared to permit "We the Majority" to amend only if he has no deep
disagreement with the substance of the amendment. 'We the Majority"
are free to be right, but not free to be wrong. "If Amar believes that there
are some decisions the people absolutely cannot make, it seems ironic for
him to say that these same people cannot require that constitutional al-
terations be effected only by the actions of extraordinary majorities. '338
Amar's failure to embrace the consequences of his belief in the authority
of "We the Majority" is a basis for doubting that it constitutes the funda-
mental principle around which the constitutional order should be
organized.
331. Amar has a different perception than I do of what "We the Majority" is likely to
do. In "Philadelphia Revisited," he argued that "We the People" might reject unwise
amendments: "[T]he People can wield their Philadelphia-II 'sword' of amendment to
deter unpopular Article V amendments, and thus preserve the constitutional status quo."
Amar, Philadelphia Revisited, supra note 2, at 1100-01.
332. Id. at 1044-45 n.1 (arguing that amendments that purport to make themselves
unamendable or that abolish free speech might be unconstitutional).
333. Professor Amar is so upset by the potential consequences of this theory that, in
the end, he virtually rejects it. See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 2, at
501-03. Interestingly, he does not develop the point that "We the Majority" must be
"rightly informed." See Kammen, supra note 89, at 14-15. Consideration of such a move
would require another article.
334. See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 2, at 501-02.
335. See Richard W. Wallach, Essay, Natural Law and Supreme Court Nominees, N.Y.
LawJ., Dec. 3, 1992, at 2, 2 ("[v]iews ofJudge Thomas expressed prior to the hearing that
there is a body of Natural Law available to override the Constitution, disturbed several
senators.").
336. See Amar, Consent of the Governed, supra note 2, at 505 (an amendment
abrogating First Amendment rights would violate first principles of the constitutional
order).
337. See Vile, Legally Amending, supra note 38, at 281-82.
338. Id. at 304.
[Vol. 96:121
ORGINAL UNDERSTANDING AND ARTICLE V
CONCLUSION
Amar begins "Consent of the Governed" with the Declaration of In-
dependence. This is illuminating. Jefferson's views on constitutional
change-every nineteen years is just about right3 39-evince a belief in
popular sovereignty and the political capacity of the people (some of
them, anyway) that is closest to Amar's viewpoint. "Jefferson embraced
the chaos, disorder, and uncertainty that comes with his democratic vi-
sion of politics," but then "Jefferson was a radical democrat."3 40 Madison
and Hamilton were not. The close relationship between Madison and
Jefferson should not disguise their profound ideological differences.3
4 1
Madison's fundamental concern-like that of the other members of the
Constitutional Convention-was to ensure order and stability, thereby
protecting property against the demos. Article V is part of a Constitution
that reflects a considered attempt to slow down change, and it has been
so understood from the very beginning of our constitutional history. In
our time, this policy may be a wise one.4 2
339. See David N. Mayer, The Constitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson 304
(1994). Federalist No. 43's caution against easy amendments is a direct response to
Jefferson. See The Federalist No. 43, at 278-79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); see also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in 13
Papers ofJames Madison, supra note 91, at 18, 20.
340. Matthews, supra note 107, at 24. Madison could write of an "Empire of reason,"
id. at 9, but, he viewed the capacity of the common man and woman as limited. See id. at
26-47.
341. For an excellent treatment of the differences, see id. at 234-72; see also Mayer,
supra note 839, at 300-01.
342. While a simple majority may be adequate for a statutory change, a constitutional
change should have something more substantial behind it. "A simple majority may by
changes in popular sentiment become a minority." Orfield, supra note 31, at 220. In fact,
Amar-despite his disclaimers-would make it easier for the people to amend the
Constitution than to secure ordinary legislation. See Vile, Legally Amending, supra note
38, at 305-06 & n.171.
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